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BOARD
In 1872, Charlotte E. Ray was the first African-American
women to be admitted to the bar in the United States. Despite her
superior legal abilities and the path she so bravely forged for all
minority female attorneys, she soon gave up the practice of law
because she could not attract sufficient clients to stay in business.
Though the legal landscape of our country has undergone
drastic changes since Ms. Ray’s time, the difficulties she experienced a woman of color in the legal field still plague the profession today. The acknowledgement of this problem and the desire
to find solutions recently spurred the American Bar Association to
release a report entitled Visible Invisibility: Women of Color in
Law Firms. The 2006 report is a culmination of surveys, focus
groups, and other research that asked male and female lawyers to
discuss their career experiences, motivations for staying in a law
firm, reasons for leaving a law firm, and salaries. After comparing the data of minority female attorneys to that of other groups,
the report uncovered marked differences between the experiences
of minority women and their counterparts. The report not only
addresses these challenges but also presents solutions to some of
the problems it brought to light.
Given the subject matter of this report, when it was brought to
the attention of The Modern American, it sparked significant discussion. However, though the focus began with the experience of
minority women, we soon found ourselves discussing the challenges faced by any person who finds that they identify with multiple minority groups. As a direct result of that conversation and
our own attempts to push the boundaries of the issue, our second
annual spring symposium is entitled: Retaining the Two-fers: The
Opportunities and Limitations Facing Those Within the Legal
Field Who Identify with Multiple Minority Groups. Our goal is to
present stimulating discussion of the topic, featuring a panel of
accomplished persons in the legal field who can speak to the issue
based on their own experiences and observations. Given that
many of our subscribers and readers are employees of or are soon
to be employees of law firms and other legal institution, we think
it is especially important that you join us for this unique discussion. We hope that you will not only enjoy discussion of such a

timely and important issue, but that you will also take the tools
that you learn from our talk back to your respective places of employment, institutions of learning, and daily life.
As evidenced by events like our symposium, we are pleased
to say that The Modern American continues to be dedicated to our
goal of providing our readers with a forum for frank, yet healthy
discourse of the issues facing America’s minority groups. As has
become our custom at this time, we would like to take a few moments to inform you of our recent accomplishments. First, as of
last semester, you can now find The Modern American on
v.lex.us, a new online international legal database.
Additionally, as mentioned in prior issues, we are working
hard to make our decision to provide a third, summer issue of The
Modern American a reality. Therefore, we are pleased to announce that this year’s summer issue will be the result of the collaborative efforts of The Modern American and the WCL chapter
of the Latino/a Law Student Association (LaLSA). The summer
2007 issue will commemorate the recently held Tenth Annual Hispanic Law Conference – The Voice of the Latino/a Lawyer: Accomplishment and Challenges. Like the topic suggests, the issue
will feature articles and other written works pertaining to the legal
issues relating to the experiences of the Latino/a attorney and
community as a whole. If you have any interest in being a part of
this ground-breaking issue, please see our submission guidelines.
We strongly encourage you to submit your piece for what will
surely be a stimulating issue.
In summation, we would like to extend a warm thank you,
first, to our staff who truly exhibit admirable levels of dedication
to the mission of The Modern American. We would also like to
thank our ever-expanding board of advisors. Their diligent advice
and words of encouragement continue to inspire us and stay our
focus.
Sincerely,
The Executive Board
The Modern American
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THE DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF PROTECTING AMERICA’S
CHILDREN
By Jennifer E. Jones*

T

he Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
has the unequivocal power to regulate indecent
broadcasting consisting of “any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communica1
tions.” Recently, indecency regulation has inspired much debate between the public, broadcasters, courts, and the FCC. Indecency regulation exists to protect only one distinct group of
people - children. Yet, current indecency enforcement is not
prosecuted on behalf of the interests of children. FCC indecency
investigations are fueled almost exclusively by complaints submitted by watchdog groups with politically conservative agendas. Consequently, instead of protecting children and facilitating
diversity in the media, the FCC’s policing of public airwaves has
effectuated cultural and political homogeneity of public airwaves.
This Article exposes current inconsistencies in the stated
policy aims of indecency regulation and the statutory requirement that the FCC facilitate diverse media broadcasts. First, this
Article discusses FCC indecency regulation generally. Second,
this Article describes the stated policy aims of indecency regulation and the inconsistencies of indecency enforcement in advancing those aims. Lastly, this Article discusses the discriminatory
impact current indecency regulation has on broadcast media.

THE POWER TO REGULATE INDECENCY
Essentially, “[o]ne breast and two seconds after the Janet
Jackson incident, America became immersed in a cultural war
between two competing interests - the broadcasters’ right to exercise their constitutional right to free speech and the FCC's
power to regulate indecent programming.”2 The Supreme Court
has long held that broadcasters have limited First Amendment
protection given the unique role which broadcasting occupies as
a medium of expression.3 More recently, the Court has recognized the need to balance First Amendment free speech rights of
broadcasters and indecency regulation interests of the government, while keeping with previous decisions which permitted the
government to limit broadcasters’ First Amendment rights.4
Both the Court’s recent appeal for caution in free speech
restrictions and the FCC’s proffered justifications for limiting
free speech have provoked strong broadcaster reactions. The
FCC’s sole justification for limiting broadcaster rights is the
“need to protect our children.”5 The premise in all indecency
precedent is that between certain hours of the day children are
uniquely susceptible to broadcasts and should be protected from
indecent material.6
However, heavy critique exists regarding the enforcement of
indecency regulations and whether this regulation is even necessary at all.7 Interestingly, a source of criticism comes directly
from FCC Commissioner Adlestein who stated that the FCC has
Spring 2007

failed to “address the many serious concerns”8 raised in previous
cases and that FCC regulations are “arbitrary, subjective and
inconsistent.”9 Commissioner Adlestein claims the FCC’s rulings do not adequately consider the “totality” of broadcast programs.10 Ultimately, the FCC’s failure to completely consider
and review broadcast programming is inconsistent with courtmandated analysis in restriction of speech cases.11
For example, the Supreme Court held in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., that
broadcast material is subject to indecency regulations when material is broadcast at times when children are reasonably likely to
be in the audience.12 However, the Court has cautioned the government in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union that indecency regulation cannot restrict the adult population to watching
only what is fit for children.13
When defending such free speech restrictions, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the indecency regulations in question are sufficiently tailored to resolve conflicts
without unnecessarily broad restrictions on speech.14 Indecency
law stems from nuisance law in that indecency regulation seeks
to channel material into acceptable timeframes, and not completely prohibit broadcast material.15 Therefore, the FCC has the
burden of showing that indecency regulations are properly tailored to protect children and promote diversity in the media
without being overly broad and restraining speech in general.
Nuisance law calls for channeling speech, not banning it altogether. However, if broadcasters are prohibited from airing certain types of diverse material during peak hours and are forced to
air material to a significantly smaller audience or not at all, bans
on speech may be effectuated.

INCONSISTENT AND MISGUIDED FCC INDECENCY
REGULATION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 mandates that the
FCC promote the public interest and diversity in the media.16
However, the FCC’s incomplete review of broadcaster regulation
has created arbitrary censorship of diverse broadcasting material
without the heightened scrutiny required by law.17 Additionally,
the FCC’s procedure of investigating and prosecuting broadcasters for broadcasting indecent material has resulted in inconsistent
enforcement of poorly reviewed regulation penalties.
More importantly, there is an intrinsic flaw in using the protection of children as the sole justification for indecency regulation. The flaw exists in the FCC’s enforcement policy since children are not the actual individuals reporting potential violations.
Rather, the children’s parents, parental advisory councils and
watchdog groups submit complaints to the FCC. Parental advisory councils and watchdog groups are problematic because they
3

often have political affiliations and partnerships with lobbyists.
Historically, these groups have pushed for an overall clean up of
the airwaves in the interest of the “public good”.18 Therefore,
the original rationale of preventing harm to children has been
morphed into campaigns for general community standards of
morality - standards which can be arbitrary and discriminatory.
Since the FCC conducts indecency regulation only when a
viewer complaint is filed,19 certain groups whose sole function is
to “patrol the airwaves” can disproportionately affect indecency
enforcement on broadcasters.20 For example, the Parental Television Council (“PTC”) was responsible for 99.9 % of indecency complaints in 2003 and 99.8 % of indecency complaints
in 2004 unrelated to the Super Bowl halftime show.21 The resulting effect is that PTC, a Republican-driven watchdog group,
hyper-monitors the public airwaves, which can effectively lead
to overbroad free speech restrictions of broadcast material.22
PTC’s founder and President, L. Brent Bozell, served as the Finance Director and President of the National Conservative Political Action Committee, furthering his political agenda.
Not only is PTC responsible for an “overwhelming majority
of FCC complaints,” but the number of complaints is drastically
rising each year due to the new ability to electronically file FCC
complaints.23 PTC regularly issues email alerts to its members
who can easily register thousands of complaints simply by filling out an online form.24 Former Chairman Powell acknowledged this complication and referred to these email complaints
as “spam.”25 Nevertheless, PTC has had an exacting hand in
selectively choosing broadcasters for the FCC to target and
prosecute for allegedly indecent broadcasts.26
Another wrinkle in the FCC’s enforcement policy is the
more subjective second prong of indecency analysis27 which is
measured using “contemporary community standards.”28 Theoretically, if the policy aims of indecency regulation were fulfilled, this contemporary community standard should be used to
shield children from harmful material. The Supreme Court relied on industry guidelines in Infinity Radio License, Inc. and
held that the community standard test is “whether the material is
patently offensive for the broadcast medium” which is gauged
by the “average broadcast viewer or listener.”29 Determining
what is “patently offensive” and defining who is an “average
broadcast viewer or listener” is not only highly subjective, but
also difficult to apply.
A tension exists between the original policy aims of protecting children and the contemporary community standards used to
measure the protection of children. The subjective bulk of indecency analysis is guided by standards, which are supposed to be
that of the average broadcast viewer or listener.30 But in reality,
the aims of indecency regulation are often distorted by watchdog
groups with socio-political agendas, capable of filing tens of
thousands of complaints per year through their members. FCC
Commissioner Adlestein expounded on this inherent inconsistency by stating that the “real party in interest is the Commission, acting on behalf [of] the public, rather than the specific
individual or organization that brings allegedly indecent material
4

to our attention.”31

DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF CURRENT FCC
INDECENCY REGULATION
Evaluating future broadcast programs for potentially indecent material requires great expenditures of money and time.32
In order for broadcasters to comply with indecency regulation as
applied to daily programs and broadcasts, they must employ
attorneys or specialists able to shield them from the risk of being
fined thousands of dollars by the FCC. Broadcasters not only
spend vast amounts of money on attempting to ensure that their
programs will not be arbitrarily targeted by watchdog groups,
but also forgo broadcasting opportunities out of fear of being
deemed non-compliant. Given that socio-political agendas of
watchdog groups effectively guide the FCC’s current indecency
enforcement policy, such regulation has negatively impacted
broadcasters.
The standard effectuated in indecency regulation is a neoconservative standard that blocks out many different kinds of
diverse media. When special interest groups, embodying sociopolitical agendas, effectively prosecute certain broadcasters or
individuals, only material indirectly deemed acceptable by that
group of individuals is spared from mass complaint filing and is
permitted on the public airwaves.
Additionally, even when individuals attempt to “break the
surface of placidity,” the very nature and importance of the expression is often misunderstood and penalized under current
indecency regulation.33 Artistic works that serve a political and
social purpose among certain minority groups are habitually
misunderstood and written off as indecent. For example, Sarah
Jones, a well-known female, African-American playwright, actor, poet, and activist wrote a song as a feminist critique of misogynistic lyrics in ‘gangsta rap’ entitled “Your Revolution.”34
However, based on a single-complaint received by the FCC, her
song was deemed to be indecent, and the radio station that aired
the song was fined.35 In her brief on appeal filed with the FCC,
Jones stated that “Your Revolution” was performed in high
schools and colleges around the country and had been praised as
a positive self-affirmation for young African-American
women.36 Sarah Jones used her lyrics as a “free (and imaginative) use of sexual language…that ma[de] the rap empowering,”37 but the FCC’s indecency regulation left no room for cultural context or analysis in its indecency assessment.
Correspondingly, another example of the FCC’s failure to
consider and value cultural context in indecency regulation was
in the case of “The Blues” documentary, comprised of interviews of several blues musicians, aired by PBS and directed by
Martin Scorsese. Generally, broadcasters feel an artistic and
educational integrity to retain certain material in its original
form to accurately convey experiences of the film subjects.
However, the FCC found “The Blues” contained indecent material in the language used by some of the interviewees. This conservative regulation effectively “paralyzed documentary filmmakers” so that filmmakers with powerful and culturally imporTHE MODERN AMERICAN

tant stories were afraid to make, tell, and air their stories on pub- tion of Janet Jackson’s blouse, yet he did not receive the social
lic broadcast television.38
backlash and fury Janet Jackson underwent for several months,
For many broadcasters, there would be no difference be- even years.
tween “Saving Private Ryan” and “The Blues” in the usage of
Given the morally conservative broadcast climate today,
certain types of language. “Saving Private Ryan” embodies one individuals in society that have been historically marginalized,
of the only known exceptions to indecency analysis, in which such as African-American women, may easily be restricted more
the FCC ruled that the use of several expletives in the war film frequently under current FCC indecency regulation.46 The
was not indecent and could exist when material was “essential to FCC’s discriminatory regulations send negative messages to
the nature of an artistic or educational work.”39 However, “The youth and to the public regarding social ideals of feminist prinBlues”, which depicted mainly African-American musicians, ciples and cultural dynamics.47 It is of the utmost importance
that the FCC not place unneceswas deemed to be indecent, while
sarily broad restrictions on broadSaving Private Ryan which decasters documenting sociopicted mainly White-American
Indecency regulation exists
cultural dialogs. Current indemale soldiers was not. This decito protect only one distinct group of
cency regulation has intimidated
sion illustrates the cultural value
people–children. Yet, currently, indebroadcasters into only broadcastjudgments reflecting a more concency enforcement is not prosecuted on
ing material that would not likely
servative moral authority that
cause tension with the conservaultimately penalized broadcasters
behalf of the interests of children.
tive agenda of watchdog groups.
of programming focused on a
But this is contrary to the statutocultural minority viewpoint.
In both of the cases listed above, Sarah Jones and “The rily mandated aim of the FCC. The FCC’s statutory mandate is
Blues,” the FCC has not issued further explanatory Orders.40 to enable public access to a diverse array of media over the pubBroadcasters and certain special interest groups believe in the lic airwaves.48 Using the FCC as a puppet, political watchdog
right to diverse sources of information as mandated by The groups have enabled FCC commissioners to become ineffective
Telecommunications Act of 199641 and the First Amendment.42 “culture czars.”49
In the minds of some, the FCC often acts as a cultural dictator,
The public, as well as broadcasters, have First Amendment
determining precisely what cultural mediums are appropriate rights to free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Inconsisand acceptable at any given time.43 In this way, even social tently and arbitrarily applied, current FCC indecency regulation
ideas damaging to certain groups, whether they involve male/ has fundamentally quashed these rights. The FCC must find a
female relations or racial dynamics, are perpetuated into law.44
way to balance the public’s mandated right and interest in diPerhaps the most famous indecent broadcast was the recent verse forms of broadcast media with the government’s interest
exposure of Janet Jackson’s breast during the Super Bowl in protecting children. Children as a group encompass individuXXXVIII Halftime Show on February 1, 2004. Some analysts als of all cultures and social classes that have the right to many
have argued that the FCC’s indecency finding based solely on kinds of culturally sensitive information, not just those deemed
Janet Jackson’s breast exposure, without regard to Justin Tim- to be decent by neo-conservative watchdog groups. The FCC
berlake’s predatory behavior or Nelly’s crotch grabbing, only has an affirmative duty to find an effective indecency regulation
served to perpetuate social ideas of men dominating women.45 regime that precludes discriminatory consequences to minority
Timberlake was the main actor in the scene, ripping off a por- groups in society.

ENDNOTES
*Jennifer E. Jones earned her B.A. from the University of Florida in sociocultural anthropology and is currently a third-year law student at American University Washington College of Law. Academic interests in technology, telecommunications, cultural politics, and the law inspired this Article. Many thanks to
the new staff of The Modern American for keeping the torch burning and to
Martha and Malcom who gave me the time and space to develop this article.
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HITTING THE LEGAL DIVERSITY MARKET HOME:
MINORITY WOMEN STRIKE OUT
By LeeAnn O’Neill*

I

n the 1990s, in-house corporate counsel began demanding
greater diversity in their outside law firms, culminating in
the 1999 Morgan Letter, a diversity manifesto signed by
more than 500 corporate general counsels to consider diversity when hiring outside counsel.2 General counsel at corporations began assessing whether women and minority lawyers
were among the client relationship managers and their likelihood to be assigned to the company’s work.3 Diversity provisions, including demographic data of the law firm as well as a
demographic breakdown of lawyers working on a company’s
matters,4 became part of most competitive bidding for legal services. Later, in-house corporate counsel raised the stakes with
the circulation of the 2004 Call to Action, which calls on inhouse corporate counsel to fire firms that lack “meaningful interest in being diverse.”5 Thus far, more than 100 companies
have signed the Call to Action.6
In 2005, Wal-Mart shocked the legal community when it
fired one of its outside law firms for failing to meet diversity
goals for women and minorities.7 Looking at the sheer number
of minority and women attorneys was not enough for Wal-Mart.
Rather, Wal-Mart required the identification of at least one minority and one woman attorney to be among the top five relationship attorneys.8 As a result of Wal-Mart’s actions, law firms
are finally being forced to take the Call for Action seriously.
For women, the positive impact of these diversity initiatives
is recognizable, but slow. In 1995, 14.2% of equity partners
were women, in comparison with 17.2% in 2005.9 Based on
current rates, it will take until 2115 to reach equal numbers of
male and female partners.10 The future for minority11 women
looks even more dismal; they represent just 1.48% of all equity
partners.12 The numbers for minority women partners seem
unlikely to rise, as the attrition rate for minority female associates has risen from 75% in the late 1990s to 86% in 2005, despite these diversity initiatives.13
Well-intentioned diversity initiatives based on the generic
advancement of “minorities and women,” however, may not
produce a complete picture of diversity. By only targeting
“minorities and women,” law firms’ diversity initiatives do not
account for the vulnerable position of minority women attorneys
as double minorities, nor do they account for unequal advancement of ethnic or racial groups, such as Asian American advancement over Latino or African American advancement.14
This article seeks to address the precarious status of minority
women attorneys, who are particularly susceptible to being left
behind in diversity initiatives. First, this article discusses the
unequal treatment of women in the legal profession and the institutional barriers to advancement that all women face. Second,
this article demonstrates how the combined effect of racial bias,
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racial hierarchies, and gender bias disparately impact minority
women within the current promotion paradigm. Third, this article analyzes how well-intentioned statistics-based law firm diversity initiatives entrench the existing two strikes against minority women while valuing female attorneys less than their
male counterparts. Finally, this article proposes new ways to
assess law firm diversity.

STRIKE ONE: PRE-EXISTING GENDER STEREOTYPING,
COGNITIVE BIAS, AND LACK OF CHOICE FOR WOMEN IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The passage of Title VII in 1964, which prompted the
American Association of Law Schools and the American Bar
Association’s adoption of equal opportunity policies for women
in the early 1970s, coupled with the subsequent explosion of
women law students in the 1970s and 1980s, flooded the market
with woman attorneys.15 Although government and legal aid
jobs were generally available to women attorneys, private law
firms often refused to interview qualified women attorneys or
offered lower salaries for positions with no promotion opportunities.16 One woman who graduated from law school in the
1970s recounted that she was hired because “they just thought it
was time to have a woman, but not that work would be assigned
to [her].”17 Once admitted, women were stereotyped by law
firms into specialties considered appropriate for women, including “library work and research, brief writing, ‘blue sky’ work,
and the specialties of trusts, estates, wills, and domestic relations.”18 Because of the nature of these specialties, women flew
under the clients’ radars. Law firms justified this conduct by
asserting that women “self-selected” these specialties, indicating
their preference for that type of work.19 Women accepted work
in these “appropriate” practice areas to gain acceptance within
the law firm and to avoid antagonizing male lawyers, thereby
sacrificing new client development, limiting existing client networking, and limiting development of legal skills in more prestigious practices in exchange.20 Partnership selection relies
heavily on inheriting an outgoing partner’s clients and subjective assessments of client recruitment and networking.21 Rather
than acknowledging the structural odds stacked against women,
law firms reason that women “self-select” into “of counsel” positions or non-partner track careers to accommodate family or
work-life balance and avoid the work of client recruitment and
development.22
“Self-selection,” however, does not explain the disproportionate numbers of women attorneys denied partnership, with
women attorneys accounting for 48% of all associates but only
17.2% of equity partners.23 Rather, discriminatory evaluations,
assignments of less important work, presumptions of incompe7

tence, inadequate mentoring, and sexual personality stereotyping
plague women in private law firms.24 For example, in Ezold v.
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, the law firm began with a
presumption of incompetence by telling Ezold during her interview that she would have a difficult time because “she was a
woman, had not attended an Ivy League law school, and had not
been on law review.”25 Once hired, the firm assigned Ezold to
“small” actions in comparison to their standard cases. When
later assigned to large, complex cases, the law firm rated her
poorly for her analytical skills.26 Finally, the law firm denied
her partnership, citing her poor analytical skills, while advancing men who scored lower in the overall partnership evaluation.27
Partnership decisions may also be influenced by implicit
gender stereotyping or cognitive bias.28 Cognitive bias is the
unconscious interjection of gender expectations into decision
making, including partnership review. For example, in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, Price Waterhouse did not refute expert
testimony that the partnership selection process was likely influenced by sex stereotyping.29 Hopkins was described both as
being “extremely competent” and “forthright” as well as abrasive and “overcompensating for being a woman.” As a solution
to aggressive interpersonal skills, one partner recommended
Hopkins be more “feminine.”30
Even though Title VII failed to provide a remedy for Hopkins and Ezold, women have used it with limited success as a
remedy for discrimination on the basis of gender in partnership
decisions at other private firms.31 Nevertheless, scholars criticize Title VII for the heavy evidentiary burden placed on plaintiffs and deference to the subjective partnership decision making
process.32 Under the current McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting
framework, a woman attorney must establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by demonstrating: (1) that she belongs to a
protected class under Title VII, or that she is a woman; (2) that
the law firm was seeking partners, that she sought partnership,
and that she was qualified for partnership; (3) that despite her
qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) that after her rejection,
the law firm continued to seek similarly qualified associates for
partnership.33 Once she meets this burden, the law firm must
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the attorney’s rejection from partnership.34 The highly subjective nature
of partnership decisions and mixed motives for denying partnership make it easier to mask unconscious biases.35 Once the law
firm articulates a nondiscriminatory reason, the woman attorney
has the “opportunity” to show that the stated reason is a pretext,
but must demonstrate pretext with evidence of overt discrimination.36 Once again, the subtle nature of unconscious bias creates
a nearly insurmountable barrier to a successful remedy under
Title VII.
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STRIKE TWO: PRE-EXISTING RACIAL STEREOTYPING,
RACIAL HIERARCHY, AND LACK OF CHOICE FOR
WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Along with the explosion of women in law schools and law
firms in the 1970s and 1980s came an increase of minority
women in the legal profession. Upon graduating, minority
women became over-represented in public defender positions or
in other government jobs and often took on work helping minorities.37 As with white women, private law firms often refused to interview qualified minority women attorneys or offered lower salaries for positions with no promotion opportunities.38 To the extent that private law firms targeted minority
women in their hiring, the underlying motivation was sometimes
to satisfy both race and sex requirements for the price of one, or,
if they were “lucky,” a black Latina attorney was three for the
price of one.39 Once admitted to private law firms, minority
women were “ghettoized”40 into certain practice areas much like
their white counterparts.41 However, minority women attorneys
further suffered under overt tokenism, as representatives of their
gender and minority groups.42 One minority woman recalled
that she “was always asked to attend functions and award ceremonies, speak to law students of color and pose for advertising
publications. However, [she] never had contact with partners in
power other than at these events.”43
Additionally, minority women often met with clients only
when their gender or race was an advantage – as when the client
requests a diverse legal team or a partner assumes that minority
clients want to see a “familiar face.”44 In a recent incident, a
Korean-American woman in her fourth year as an associate discussed how these assumptions can backfire:
[A managing partner] introduced me to the
client who was Korean and he tells him that
I’m Korean, too. He said, “She eats kim
chee, just like you.” He said to me, “Talk to
him.” I looked at the client and said, “It’s a
pleasure to meet you. I’m sure you speak
English better than I speak Korean.” The
client’s face was so red. Then the partner left
a message on my internal message system,
and he was speaking gibberish, trying to
sound like an Asian speaker.45
Not only did this incident reinforce race matching, but
it also implicitly marked the Korean-American woman
as a Korean hostess to the Korean client, rather than
establishing the woman as the client’s attorney.
In addition to cognitive bias against women, minority
women may also suffer under unconscious racism.46 For example, minority women attorneys are often mistaken for secretaries, court reporters, or paralegals.47 The disparate impact of the
“double negative” of being a woman and a minority is evident –
nearly two-thirds of minority women attorneys compared to 4%
of white men were excluded from networking opportunities;
44% of minority women compared to 2% of white men were
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denied desirable assignments; 43% of minority women compared to 3% of white men were limited from client development
opportunities; nearly one-third of minority women compared to
less than 1% of white men felt they received unfair performance
evaluations;48 and 20% of minority women compared to 1% of
white men felt they were denied promotions.49 It is important to
note that the “careers of white women attorneys and men attorneys of color were neither as disadvantaged as those of women
attorneys of color.”50 All of these biases culminate in the disparity of retention rates in law firms for minority women at 53%
compared to 72% for white men.51 However, while white men
often left to go to other large law firms, many minority women
left for smaller or minority-owned law firms, accounting for the
estimated 86% attrition rate for minority women.52
Often overlooked is the nuanced difference between stereotypes of particular groups of minority women and their effects
on women lawyers.53 Asian-American women attorneys may be
stereotyped as “hard-working, obedient, and compliant (a racialized and gendered stereotype), but also as sexually available in a
particularly racialized way.”54 Additionally, Asian-American
women attorneys may be seen as too passive for litigation or
other “bet the firm” type of work.55 Interestingly, the very traits
lacking in so-called passive and obedient Asian-American
women attorneys are considered detrimental for so-called aggressive and combative African-American women attorneys,
who are also considered “sexually available” and sexualized as
“deceitful and promiscuous.”56 African-American women attorneys are particularly susceptible to having their attorney status
overlooked and mistaken as support staff.57 Latina attorneys
may be questioned about their immigration status or stereotyped
as speaking Spanish.58 Additionally, they may often be channeled into immigration work under the assumption that they
would have a vested interest.59 Finally, Arab-American women
attorneys may be stereotyped as oppressed by their veils or as
“passive victim[s] of Arab patriarchy.”60 Although not exhaustive, these stereotypes demonstrate both overt and unconscious
biases confronting minority women in the legal field.
These racial biases are compounded by a hierarchy in white
America’s prejudice and stereotyping toward different racial
groups – with African Americans at the very bottom of the racial hierarchy, followed by Latinos, and with Asian Americans
often scoring positively.61 Social stereotyping often manifests
itself in hiring and partnership decisions in private law firms.62
For example, although Asian Americans accounted for 11.3%
of the top 20 law school graduates in 2005, they accounted for
15% of large law firm associates.63 Compare this to African
Americans accounting for 7.4% of law school graduates and
just 5% of associates, as well as Latinos accounting for 6.9% of
law school graduates and just 4.7% of associates.64 Between
1998 and 2005, the growth of Asian-American attorneys (nearly
doubling from 8.7% to 15%) at large law firms dwarfed the
growth of African-American attorneys (marginally growing
from 4% to 5%) and Latino attorneys (marginally growing from
3.7% to 4.7%), suggesting that societal racial hierarchies transSpring 2007

late to private law firms.65 However, once allowed to move up
the power structure, it seems that all minorities are left out, with
Asian Americans as 11.8% of the pre-partner pool and 3.7% of
the new partners; African Americans as 4.2% of the pre-partner
poll and 1.2% of the new partners; and Latinos as 2.9% of the
pre-partner pool and 1.6% of the new partners.66 The gender
and racial hierarchies represented in the studies were also evident in Jenner & Block LLP’s summer associate class, which
was the largest reported summer associate class in 2001 - there
were 90 white summer associates (61 men and 29 women), 10
Asian-American summer associates (6 men and 4 women), 4
Latino summer associates (2 men and 2 women), and 1 AfricanAmerican summer associate (0 men and 1 woman).67 Consequently, minority women are subject to three levels of subjugation in preference: first, subjugated as women; second, subjugated as minorities; and third, subjugated within their own minority status.
While Title VII provides an available remedy for discrimination against minority women, the burden-shifting framework
presents some practical difficulties for proving discrimination
based on the intersection of gender and race.68 First, there are
no cases to date challenging a partnership decision in the legal
profession on the basis of gender plus race, perhaps for the very
reason that Title VII is not an effective remedy for minority
women. The current framework for challenging partnership
decisions may require that a woman choose to litigate as a
woman or as a minority, but not as both.69 Thus, minority
women risk the catch-22 of courts bifurcating their female self
from their minority self, finding that separately they have not
been discriminated against as a woman or as a minority, and
ignoring that the permutation of both was the basis of their discrimination.70
There are, however, a growing number of cases recognizing
intersectionality of protected classes under Title VII.71 The
Fifth Circuit found that African-American women constituted a
separate protected class under Title VII in Jeffries v. Harris
County Community Action Ass’n.72 Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit found in Lam v. University of Hawaii that treating race
and gender discrimination separately did not adequately assess
the form of discrimination leveled against an Asian-American
woman.73 In particular, the Ninth Circuit found that AsianAmerican women experience a different set of stereotypes than
do Asian-American men and white women.74 However, even
after proving all of the elements of prima facie discrimination, a
minority woman attorney may have difficulty demonstrating the
nuanced discrimination faced by her sub-class in proving pretext for denial of partnership. Moreover, the relatively small
numbers of women and minorities in private law firms makes it
difficult to find an appropriate “similarly situated” attorney for
comparison. In Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, the court used
intersectionality of protected classes against an AfricanAmerican woman, holding that she was not similar enough to
all women to be certified as a class representative.75 Additionally, there were no “statistically significant” numbers of Afri9

can-American women employed by the defendant company,
barring her from bringing a claim as an African-American
woman.76 Given that the Moore court found that an AfricanAmerican woman was significantly different than white women
and African-American men, should Arab-American women be
compared with Arab-American men, other minority women in
general, or white women?77 In law firms, finding an appropriate “similarly-situated” person is complicated further by the
small numbers of other minorities available for comparison.

STRIKE THREE: THE NEW DIVERSITY MARKET, MARKET
DYSFUNCTION, AND DIVERSITY QUEUES
The lack of an effective remedy under Title VII, the massive attrition rates for minority women in large law firms, and
the lack of law firm commitment to diversity drove the rapidly
diversifying general counsel of corporations to take action. The
Morgan Letter and the Call to Action brought forth a flood of
diversity initiatives based on the number of minorities and
women in law firms, creating a new market for diversity.78 Top
law students also prioritize diversity when conducting job
searches, forcing law firms to at least address the issue to attract
the most qualified candidates.79 In June 2005, Wal-Mart sent a
letter to its 100 largest outside counsel requesting a list of three
to five potential partners who would manage the case with the
general counsel, requiring at least one minority and one
woman.80 Oracle asked “that the first person [a law firm] consider for assignment to the case be a woman or a minority employee of your firm with appropriate experience.”81 Large corporations, including Dupont and General Motors, track and
monitor the number of hours worked by minority and women
lawyers on their matters by their outside law firms.82 Large corporations also require demographic breakdowns of minority and
women associates and partners.83
Corporate counsel diversity initiatives may not actually
generate change in private law firms, however. First, law firms
may be resistant to change or do not have effective diversity
policies.84 Some law firms have responded to diversity initiatives by substituting exclusionary discrimination of women and
minority attorneys with tokenism and “mascoting,” reminiscent
of law firms’ reactions to the affirmative action policies of the
1970s.85 Furthermore, law firms such as Venable LLP, Womble
Carlyle Sandridge & Rice LLP, and Sonnenschein Nath &
Rosenthal LLP have circumvented actual change in their partnership structure by forming alliances with minority-owned law
firms.86 Although their motive may not have been to circumvent
change, these alliances were prompted by a lack of qualified
minorities and women in their firms.87 Not only does this allow
big firms to “outsource” diversity, but it denies their own minority and women attorneys the opportunity to pursue these cases.88
Additionally, diversity initiatives may actually entrench
minority stereotypes. A danger implicit in diversity initiatives is
a tendency to assume clients of a particular racial background
prefer to work with attorneys of the same background or for
clients to request an attorney of a particular background.89 By
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demanding diversity, general counsel may be intentionally or
unintentionally calling for race or gender matching.90 This reinforces race and gender essentialism and assumes that an African-American male client prefers an African-American male
attorney or that an Asian-American woman client prefers an
Asian-American female attorney.91 “Race matching” by private
law firms, however, is prohibited under Title VII. For example,
although employers may engage in affirmative action to remedy
past discrimination, basing job assignments on racial stereotypes
violates Title VII.92
Furthermore, if assigned to a case by virtue of race, gender,
or a combination of both, minority and women attorneys may
not be able to turn down assignments without detrimentally impacting their partnership opportunities. For example, in King v.
Phelps Dunbar, an African-American male attorney claimed
that partners at the firm withheld work and unfairly criticized his
work after turning down assignments made because of his
race.93 Additionally, King refused to return to a trial after the
opposing counsel made a racially insensitive remark.94 Although it was undisputed that King’s evaluations were positive
prior to these incidents and sharply declined until his resignation
several years later, the court found that King lacked evidence
tying the critical evaluations to these incidents.95 Consequently,
when diversity initiatives prompt “race matching,” minorities
may not realistically be able to turn down an assignment. This
has implications for career development for minorities who may
have an interest in particular practice areas, but are channeled
into work where a particular client wants a minority. The relatively small number of minorities in law firms greatly increases
the likelihood of this phenomenon. For example, in the Jenner
& Block LLP example, if a client had requested that an AfricanAmerican summer associate work on his case, only one summer
associate would qualify, forcing her to take the case.
Finally, numbers-based diversity initiatives put a stigma on
women and minorities as “affirmative action hires.”96 Attorneys
hired to meet general counsel diversity standards may lead to the
dominant white male partners further questioning their abilities
and qualifications.97 For example, preferences for hiring African Americans may be viewed as counterproductive in large law
firms and as evidence that African Americans are not as qualified as their white counterparts.98 This is the same type of rationale used in discussing why minorities leave large law firms
in droves.99
Even if private law firms do not side-step changes in their
diversity initiatives, the “minorities and women” standard set
forth by the general counsel may entrench the existing marginalization of minority women. Continued use of a vague
“minority and women” category may allow law firms to hide
behind their existing diversity marketing. For example, a survey
of the top ten ranked law firms, ranked by associate satisfaction,
diversity, hours, pay, associate/partner relations, formal and informal training, and pro bono commitment,100 demonstrates that
even the best law firms utilize the generic diversity standard of
“women and minorities” on their recruitment websites. The
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“women and minorities” standard is evidenced in diversity ini- women.112 If the diversity queue really does exist, the odds are
tiatives that boast of recruitment of “25% persons of color”101 to stacked against the seven minority women at the bottom of the
“hosting diversity events”102 to “diversity scholars programs.”103 queue. Although there is no direct evidence of a diversity
Some tout advancement of women attorneys, but reviewing the queue, the current composition of law firms certainly implies
ethnic and racial backgrounds of their female partners reveals there could be, and that it would be worth further inquiry in the
that advancement of women attorneys really means advance- future.
ment of white women attorneys.104 When firms list their diverMAKING IT TO HOME: THE FINAL SCORE
sity statistics on their recruitment websites, they generally do
not provide a breakdown of minority women and minority men.
Current diversity initiatives, while well-intentioned, are
105
However, a review of the gender of their minority partners fraught with loopholes and problems such as the lack of a unireveals advancement of minority
form diversity amongst general
male attorneys, rather than micounsel, implicit race matching,
nority women attorneys.106 Adand lack of transparency in diverWell-intentioned diversity initiatives
ditionally, most of the law firms’
sity programs at the law firms.
based on generic advancement of
recruitment websites clumped
Moreover, the new push by cor“minorities and women,” however,
the diversity statistics for all
porate general counsel for inmay not produce a complete
their offices together, rather than
creasing the numbers of women
providing an office-by-office
and minorities will simply enpicture of diversity.”
breakdown.
Others did not
trench the current problems, remake mention of diversity prosulting in the continued margingrams at all.107 These were just a few of the generalized images alization of minority women. By targeting only “minorities and
of diversity presented by the top ten law firms, none of which women,” diversity initiatives do not account for the vulnerable
provided a clear picture of the actual diversity of their law firm.
position of minority women attorneys as double minorities, nor
Minority women may also be denied access to the prestig- do they account for unequal advancement of ethnic or racial
ious large corporate cases because of their current position groups, such as Asian American advancement over Latino or
within the “diversity queue.”108 Barbara Reskin and Patricia African American advancement, within law firms.113
Roos discuss job queues as the ordering of a group of employees
Uniform diversity standards should replace the haphazard
in the order of preference, where employers will choose the em- diversity reporting requirements established by corporate genployee in the highest position on the job queue as possible. His- eral counsel for their outside law firms. Instead, an ABA divertorically, employers created “gender queues” in their hiring sity certification program for law firms could create one uniform
practices, hiring men before women.109 An updated version of standard and yearly renewal and oversight over law firm diverthe “gender queue” would be the “diversity queue,” or the rank- sity initiatives.114 Currently, the ABA offers Continuing Legal
ing of minorities and women in the order of most preferred to Education (CLE) courses on diversity and has the institutional
least preferred. Thus, female attorneys are not only valued less knowledge from its comprehensive reports on diversity.115 The
than male attorneys, but they are also placed lower in the job ABA has already worked in conjunction with corporate general
queue by virtue of being assigned less important work and pre- counsel to discuss diversity strategies and could continue to do
sumed to be incompetent. Additionally, the existence of a racial so in creating a new diversity certification program.116 Although
hierarchy caused by cognitive bias and stereotyping, may ele- these types of programs have always been voluntary, corporate
vate Asian Americans over Latinos and African Americans in general counsel could agree to only use and retain law firms
the job queue. Therefore, minority women may be lowered who are certified by the ABA as meeting their diversity requirewithin the job queue by virtue of being a woman and a minority.
ments. Therefore, while diversity certification would not be
Although this phenomenon has not been studied before, the
mandatory, the corporate signatories to the “Call to Action”
current composition of law firm diversity, especially among the
could simply consult the ABA to verify law firms in compliance
partners of law firms, supports the hypothesis that minority men
with their diversity objectives, creating a business case for law
and white women are more successful in their law firm careers
firms to obtain their diversity certification.
than minority women.110 It is worth noting that minority male
Additionally, general counsel should stop utilizing diversity
partners outnumber their female counterparts more than two to
quotas, which could serve to perpetuate “affirmative action bias”
one, despite the fact there are more minority woman associates
and disproportionately disenfranchise minority women attorthan minority male associates.111 For example, using Jenner &
neys. Rather than focusing on statistics, which tends to promote
Block LLP’s 2001 summer associate class composition reflectrace or gender matching, a diversity certification program could
ing 111 attorneys, a requirement of assigning a minority or
provide measures resolving or redressing institutional biases
woman attorney to a particular case could create a queue with
against women, minorities, and minority women. For example,
44 eligible attorneys to fulfill the diversity requirement - 29
the ABA certification program could require equity partners to
white women, eight minority men, and seven minority
attend a certain number of diversity CLEs as part of their certifiSpring 2007
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cation requirements.117 Consequently, for law firms whose clients are part of the “Call to Action,” this would create a business
case for attendance in order to secure the ABA diversity certification and retain their client’s work. Additionally, diversity
inclusiveness and environment could be assessed through yearly
surveys of each law firm’s associates and partners, with reports
generated back to each law firm to identify particular areas of
concern. The ABA already has the resources to put together an
effective questionnaire and could include factors such as associate/partner relations, experiences of discrimination, availability
of work, and others.118 To allow for personalized diversity programs within each law firm, renewal of certification could be
tied to closing the gap between associate and partner perceptions
of work environment. Although numbers may be important to
assess the medium and long term success rates of diversity certification, they should not be the primary focus as they are now.
Each law firm’s diversity statistics at the associate and partner level should be made publicly available through the ABA,
with the breakdown of women (and each sub-category of minorities) and men (and each sub-category of minorities) to avoid
the double counting of minority status as well as identify the
advancement of each particular minority group. Furthermore,
the ABA could follow the National Association for Legal Professionals example of reporting by office to avoid double counting or blurring the numbers of one firm across several offices
which could mask diversity problems one particular branch of-

fice.119 The availability of detailed statistics will force law firms
to deal with the realities of their numbers rather than hiding behind idyllic diversity brochures and allow prospective employees to assess the environment of the law firm independently.
Finally, partnership requirements should be more transparent, with clear requirements and benchmarks for associates to
rely on in their career development. The subjective nature of
partnership decisions makes it difficult for women and minority
associates to determine and prove the reason for failing to make
partner, since law firms can easily point to other motives.120
Transparency would help relieve the evidentiary burden on minority attorneys making claims under Title VII and help make
Title VII a more effective remedy.
The future success of diversity initiatives promulgated by
corporate general counsel will depend on their ability to coordinate with each other to leverage their influence to make the business case for diversity in law firms. Law firms must feel the
financial impact of not meeting diversity standards. In particular, this will require more corporations to act like Wal-Mart has
done and fire law firms that do not meet their diversity goals.
By making the bottom line money and shifting the focus from
merely increasing the number of women and minorities to evaluating a firm’s environment of inclusiveness, senior equity partners will be more likely to commit to diversity.
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PLEASE DON’T FEED THE HOMELESS: POTTINGER REVISITED
By Shirley D. Howell*

I

n 1988, Miami’s homeless population filed a class action, viduals who had no homes and were “doubled up”13 living with
Pottinger v. City of Miami,2 alleging that city officials friends or relatives. Only those persons “who lack a permanent
acted in concert to deprive them of their civil rights. address and sleep in places not designed to be sleeping accomWhile the Pottinger litigation was ongoing, Hurricane modations for human beings... and those living in shelters”14
Andrew struck Miami, leaving 200,000 additional homeless in were considered homeless. Thus, those living under the roofs of
its wake3 and creating what the Pottinger court termed “a worst their families and friends did not meet the definition.
possible” scenario.4 It was the first time that a hurricane figured
Adult males constituted 44% of the homeless population
into homelessness litigation, and it is likely that the outcome of before Hurricane Katrina.15 Women16 accompanied by minor
the case was in fact affected by the hurricane. The court held children17 were the fastest growing segment of the chronically
Miami officials liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 the homeless18 and made up 36% of the homeless population.19
Eighth Amendment,6 the Fourth Amendment,7 the Due Process Some 750,000 children were homeless20 before Katrina and 1.5
Clause,8 and the right to travel,9 perhaps in part because the trag- million elderly had “worst case housing needs.”21 Fifty percent
edy of mass homelessness was showcased by Hurricane An- of the homeless were African Americans, 35% White Ameridrew. In the face of so great a
cans, 12% Latinos, 2% Native
homeless population, the Court
Americans, and 1% were Asian
The causes of
could not dismissively assume
Americans.22
Your house is your larger body
America’s rising homelessness
that people were homeless as a
It grows in the sun and sleeps
rate have been debated for decresult of a perverse desire to be
In
the
stillness
of
the
night;
ades. Some contend that perso, nor would it ignore the multiAnd it is not dreamless. 1
sonal deficiencies such as mental
ple violations of their constituillness,23 substance abuse,24 intional rights.
carceration,25 and an intergeneraThe similarities between the
homelessness scenarios created by Hurricanes Andrew and tional dependence upon welfare26 are the primary causes of
Katrina are startling, each storm leaving behind an unassimi- homelessness. Others cite macroeconomic factors such as loss
lated, newly homeless population to join the already burgeoning of low-income housing,27 unemployment and underemployranks of America’s homeless population. While compassion has ment,28 and a regressive tax structure.29 Notably, neither school
worn thin, evacuees have been ousted from temporary lodging. of thought considers the impact of natural disasters.
Years before Hurricane Katrina created the largest homeless
If adequate societal measures are not taken to house these evacuees, they will be forced to live in the streets, parks, and under population in American history, the public had developed
“compassion fatigue” with homelessness.30 San Francisco enbridges, as were the Pottinger plaintiffs.
acted a series of ordinances through its so-called Matrix ProThis article will explore the relevance of Pottinger as the
gram to criminalize sleeping in a park, begging near a highway,
national homeless population rises to approximately five milor blocking a sidewalk.31 Eleven thousand of San Francisco’s
lion in the twenty first century. Part I summarizes the demopoorest people were incarcerated as a result of the Matrix Prographics and causes of mass homelessness and addresses negagram.32 In Santa Anna, the homeless were rounded up, transtive public reactions to the increased visibility of the homeless
ported to a football stadium, physically marked with numbers,
in major American cities. Part II outlines and discusses the succhained for hours, and ultimately released to a different locacessful causes of action brought by the homeless in Pottinger.
tion.33 Massachusetts has imposed criminal sanctions upon
Part III concludes by setting forth proposals that would reinthose who “move about from place to place begging.”34 Alavigorate incentives to construct additional affordable housing,
bama has made it a criminal act to wander about “in a public
revisit America’s regressive tax schedule, and afford the homeplace for the purpose of begging.”35
less suspect classification.
In response to increasing homelessness in 1984,36 during
OVERVIEW OF HOMELESSNESS BEFORE HURRICANE
which thousands of individuals were sleeping in Bicentennial
KATRINA
Park37 and other public venues, Miami police were directed “to
In 2000, an estimated two million Americans were home- identify food sources for the poor and to arrest and/or force an
”38
To keep the
less on any given night.10 Between 2.5 and 3.5 million Ameri- extraction of the undesirables from the area.
”39
11
the
parks and
homeless
moving
and
effectively
“sanitize
cans experienced homelessness every year, and 30% of the
12
streets, police were relentless in raiding the campsites of the
homeless had been without homes for more than two years.
40
41
These numbers do not include the indeterminate number of indi- homeless, summarily destroying all on-site belongings. HisSpring 2007
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tory is repeating itself. In July 2006, Las Vegas enacted an ordinance to ban the giving of food to the homeless.42 A violation of
the ordinance can be punished by a maximum fine of $1,000 and
a jail term of up to six months.

POTTINGER REVISITED
If America’s Post-Katrina response to the unprecedented
surge of homelessness is to harass the homeless by jailing them
or jailing those who feed homeless, the issues and remedies addressed in Pottinger become relevant again. These issues and
remedies are addressed below.
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The most sensitive issue in homelessness litigation concerns
the voluntariness of the homeless defendant’s actions. Purely
involuntary acts cannot properly or morally be condemned as
crimes under the Eighth Amendment. To punish a person for
his or her involuntary act would be cruel.43 The question then is
whether a homeless person’s acts are voluntary. A homeless
person who commits rape cannot reasonably assert homelessness as justification for the misdeeds. In that case, status as a
homeless person is irrelevant, and society cannot reasonably be
expected to tolerate such behavior. The question is more complex when a homeless defendant with nowhere else to go is
prosecuted for harmless acts such as sleeping in a park. Is a
public action “voluntary” when the homeless defendant must
perform it to survive, and he has no private place in which to
perform the action?
The Pottinger court resolved the question by asking another: is the defendant voluntarily homeless?44 If a defendant
has voluntarily chosen to be homeless, he could be legally and
morally deemed to have voluntarily assumed the risk of having
to break the law to survive. It is unreasonable for society to
lower its expectation of public conduct in order to accommodate
a private and voluntary choice of that character. However, if the
defendant’s homelessness is involuntary, a just society should
not prosecute him for the indicia that attach to the fact of his or
her homelessness. The success of the Pottinger case rested in
large part upon the plaintiffs’ ability to prove that they were
suffering an involuntary45 state of homelessness and were compelled to perform life-sustaining acts in public view.46
The United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. Califor47
nia held that a defendant could not be criminally punished for
mere status as a drug addict, finding that a statute that made it
punishable to be addicted to narcotics constituted cruel and unusual punishment.48 In Powell v. Texas,49 the Supreme Court
addressed a similar issue of whether an alcoholic could be jailed
for appearing drunk in public.50 The Court held that Powell had
not been jailed for merely being addicted to alcohol, but for his
active conduct of appearing in public in a drunken state.51 Powell is often cited by municipalities that arrest the homeless for
the proposition that the homeless are not being punished for
being homeless, but for their actions in violation of the law.
Such arguments miss the point when the defendant is involuntar16

ily homeless. The alcoholic, theoretically, can restrict his drinking to his home and avoid punishment, but the homeless have no
homes in which to perform what are usually private acts.52
Sleeping in parks, sitting on sidewalks, and begging are perfect
examples. To criminalize such actions when they are unavoidable is tantamount to prosecuting the homeless for existing, and
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments is impermissibly violated.
The plaintiffs have historically borne the burden to establish
that their public actions were, in fact, unavoidable. In Pottinger,
the plaintiffs met that burden with statistical evidence and expert
testimony.53 The plaintiffs offered irrefutable statistical evidence of the severe shortage of beds in homeless shelters in Miami when they were arrested.54 The expert witnesses also testified that people seldom choose to be homeless.55 However, public policy that requires the homeless to bear the burden of proving the voluntariness of their status is inherently flawed.
The homeless, by definition, are persons with extremely
limited resources, and they are not entitled to state-appointed
attorneys in civil litigation in defense of their rights. But for the
pro bono advocacy of the American Civil Liberties Union,56 the
Pottinger plaintiffs would have lacked the resources to amass
statistics proving Miami’s shelters were inadequate to house the
homeless population. They also would not have been able to
procure the experts57 who were pivotal in establishing that people are seldom homeless by choice.58 The better public policy
would allow the plaintiff to meet the burden of a prima facie
case by establishing the actions committed by the state or municipality in violation of his or her rights and the fact of his
homelessness at the time of arrest. The burden should then shift
to the defendants to establish by a preponderance of evidence
that the plaintiff is voluntarily homeless and thus, answerable
for his or her public actions. This policy would serve dual meritorious purposes: (i) to enhance the ability of the homeless
plaintiff to find counsel who would accept his or her case, and
(ii) to motivate states and their municipalities to cease efforts to
harass the homeless out of their towns, and instead explore serious options for providing adequate affordable housing.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The homeless are gravely concerned about the conservation
of those meager resources that they still have. In Miami, the
police frequently destroyed the on-site belongings of the homeless59 as though the property were public rubbish. In one particularly notorious raid, the Miami police handcuffed a group of
homeless individuals, piled their clothing, medications, and a
Bible together, and burned them while the homeless watched.60
The homeless contended that the police seized and destroyed
their property without due process of law in direct violation of
the Fourth Amendment.61
While a seizure of property occurs when there is a
“meaningful interference” with an individual’s interest in that
property,62 a seizure of property is unreasonable only if the
state’s legitimate interests in the seizure do not outweigh the
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individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the object of the
search.63 The question then is whether the plaintiffs have a legitimate expectation of privacy in personal property that may
appear to others to be public rubbish. Determining the nature of
any legitimate expectation of privacy in personal property involves two separate inquiries. First, the court inquires whether
the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy in the objects.64 Second, the court must determine whether that expectation is one that society should be prepared to recognize as reasonable.65 If the homeless make efforts to protect their belongings by attempting to shelter them from public view, stacking
them in organized piles, or designating another homeless person
to guard them, there is evidence of subjective expectation of
privacy.
The second inquiry is more difficult. Should the public
recognize the homeless person’s right to privacy when his or her
property is littering the streets or public parks? In Rakas v. Illinois,66 the Supreme Court offered guidelines for determining the
legitimacy of a plaintiff’s privacy interests. As a trespasser or
one who leaves property accessible to the public, the plaintiff
may lose his or her privacy interests in the property; whereas
one who is lawfully on property and shields it from public view
may retain a subjective expectation in privacy that the public
will recognize. The term trespasser is turned on its head “when
there is nowhere” private that a homeless person may lawfully
be.67
The Court has not specifically addressed the issue of
whether a homeless person living outdoors has a privacy interest
in their property that the public would find reasonable, but a
Connecticut court has addressed the issue in part. Based on society’s established deferential treatment of closed containers, the
court in State v. Mooney68 recognized a right of privacy in the
closed duffel bags of the homeless. The court elaborated:
[T]he interior of these items is, in effect, the
defendant’s last shred of privacy from the prying eyes of outsiders, including the police.
Our notions of custom and civility, and our
code of values, would include some measure
of respect for that shred of privacy, and would
recognize it as reasonable under the circumstances of this case.69
Does a homeless person have a lesser interest in his clothing
or medications because he has no duffel bag in which to enclose
them? From the perspective of the homeless, the answer is selfevident. However, municipalities also have a legitimate interest
in the sanitation and safety of public spaces,70 which can be
compromised by the accumulation of rubbish. The Pottinger
court balanced the conflicting interests, holding that the homeless had a legitimate expectation of privacy in their property, so
long as the property did not create a public danger.71 The court
held that the city was free to confiscate items such as mattresses
with exposed springs because such items posed a clear danger.
However, the court enjoined the destruction of non-harmful possessions such as Bibles, clothing, eyeglasses, medications, and
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personal identification, and declared such destruction a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.72
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Ordinances that prohibit the homeless from performing innocent, necessary functions in public often fail for vagueness or
overbreadth. A statute is vague when it fails to give fair notice
of the forbidden conduct.73 The Supreme Court held void vagrancy ordinances in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville because the statutes did not give sufficiently clear notice of the
behavior that was prohibited.74 Loitering statutes have suffered
the same fate. In 1983, the Supreme Court overturned California’s loitering statute that required citizens wandering the streets
to produce identification upon a police officer’s request.75 Although the homeless plaintiffs in Pottinger did not attack Miami’s ordinances on a vagueness theory, the plaintiffs did focus
on the unconstitutional overbreadth of the ordinances when they
were applied to innocent conduct of the homeless.
A statute is overbroad when it reaches constitutionally protected conduct or conduct which is beyond the power of the state
to regulate.76 A challenge based upon overbreadth will be upheld if the enactment reaches “a substantial amount”77 of constitutionally protected conduct. Prior to Pottinger, there was no
precedent for acts such as eating, sleeping, and sitting to enjoy
constitutional protection, unless such acts could be characterized
as expressive conduct.78 For the most part, however, when the
homeless eat, sleep, and sit in public, they intend no expressive
conduct. They are performing those acts for the same reasons
the housed perform them: they are necessary to survival. However, the Pottinger court held that when an involuntarily homeless person performs such acts in public “at a time of day when
there is no place they can lawfully be,”79 the statute becomes
overbroad for punishing innocent conduct, and the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause is impermissibly infringed.80
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to travel as a
fundamental right in Edwards v. California81 and reaffirmed it
in Shapiro v. Thompson.82 In striking down a Connecticut statute denying public assistance to persons who had not been residents of the state for one year, the Shapiro decision reasoned
that the statute discouraged travel by the poor by withholding
benefits from those who would have otherwise qualified to receive them.83 In 1972, the Supreme Court in Memorial Hospital
v. Maricopa County84 struck down a statute that conditioned
free medical care upon a one-year residency requirement.85
This case is especially significant in homelessness cases because
the Court specifically denounced the statute for denying indigents “the basic necessities of life”86 and for the deterrent effect
such statutes have on the rights of the poor to migrate.
Because the right to travel is a fundamental right, statutes or
ordinances infringing that right must be in furtherance of a com17

pelling state interest.87 They must also represent the least intrusive method for furthering those state interests.88 State interests
such as maintaining public spaces in order to promote tourism,
business, and developing inner-city downtown and park areas
are not compelling interests. The Supreme Court has held that
such interests are substantial but not compelling.89 Further, the
practice of arresting the homeless is not narrowly tailored to
achieving the goals of promoting tourism or developing business. The involuntarily homeless arrested under such laws have
no recourse but to return to their public lives upon their release
from custody. Thus, nothing is ultimately accomplished by the
arrests. If cities wish to promote their attractiveness to business
and tourism, they must address both short-term and permanent
housing for their homeless populations.
CIVIL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
In 1961, the Supreme Court reinvigorated civil rights protections that had largely remained dormant for some ninety
years. In Monroe v. Pape,90 the Court concluded that a party
injured by the unconstitutional actions of police officers could
recover damages in federal court under § 1983. The police
broke into the Monroe home, rousted them from bed, and ransacked the house.91 Mr. Monroe was arrested, but was not allowed to call his attorney and was not promptly arraigned.92
Monroe claimed that he suffered an unlawful search and seizure
in Violation of the Fourth Amendment.93 He further claimed
that his constitutional rights had been violated by the detention.
Reversing the lower court’s dismissal of the claims against the
police officers,94 the Supreme Court opined that police conduct
may be actionable when it is in violation of constitutional rights.
Municipalities may also be held liable for the actions of city
officials when those officials act to execute a “policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy.”95 In § 1983 litigation, the homeless plaintiffs also bear the burden of establishing that the actions were both persistent and widespread.96 Evidence that the actions were isolated would be legally insufficient
to warrant relief against the municipality,97 though the offending
officers might remain liable for the actions.
In Pottinger, discovery revealed internal memoranda that
were “directed to high-ranking police department officials”98
regarding the need to oust the homeless from Miami’s public
areas. The persistent and widespread nature of the attacks on the
homeless was a matter of public record. Over 3,500 homeless
individuals had been arrested in Miami when the suit was filed.
The city could not escape liability under § 1983 for its acts of
purposeful harassment of the homeless.99
EQUAL PROTECTION
In Harper v. State Board of Elections,100 the Supreme Court
opined that “wealth, like race, creed, or color is not germane to
one's ability to participate in the electoral process. Lines drawn
on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”101 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
18

declined every opportunity to grant the homeless the suspect
classification that is afforded to other historically victimized
groups. This status is critical to the homeless population since
only those state laws that discriminate against suspect groups are
subjected to strict scrutiny102 and cannot stand unless the state
demonstrates a compelling interest that is furthered by a narrowly tailored policy.103
The Supreme Court has adopted the following criteria in its
suspect-class analysis: (i) whether the disadvantaged class is
defined by a trait that frequently bears no relationship to ability
to contribute to society; (ii) whether the class has been saddled
with unique disabilities because of prejudice and inaccurate
stereotypes; and (iii) whether the trait defining the class is immutable.104 The homeless can make a strong claim to a suspect
or quasi-suspect class.
The homeless are a class defined by their abject poverty,
and that state of poverty frequently bears no relationship to an
actual inability to contribute to society. Many of the homeless
have strong work histories105 and were rendered homeless by
events beyond their control.106 One has only to review the acts
perpetrated against the homeless in Miami and San Francisco to
be persuaded of the dangerous prejudice of the public against
the homeless.
The last prong of analysis proves more challenging. Do the
homeless have defining, immutable characteristics? If the term
means literally “a characteristic that cannot be changed,” the
homeless must fail in their attempts to achieve suspect classification. The judicial history of the term does not, however, suggest so rigid a definition. Aliens, who enjoy protection as a suspect class, can become citizens, thereby changing their
“immutable” characteristic. Gender, which is protected, can be
altered surgically, thus altering the gender characteristic. By
analogy, the mere fact that the homeless can again become
housed does not alter the fact that, while one is in fact homeless,
it is physically apparent to society.
The Supreme Court in Lyng107 adopted a broader interpretation of immutability, including an inquiry as to whether the class
members “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.”108 The homeless
have glaringly distinguishing characteristics: they reside under
bridges, sleep in parks, shelters and other public places, and they
beg.
POTTINGER’S IMPACT
Litigation in Pottinger spanned a decade. Ultimately, the
court enjoined the city of Miami from arresting its homeless so
long as they ere not engaged in conduct harmful to others or
themselves.109 Miami was ordered to establish “safe zones”110
in areas where the homeless could access food programs and
health services. The parties ultimately negotiated a financial
settlement for the homeless plaintiffs.111
The impact of the case was immediate. Both the city of
Miami and other private entities constructed shelters for the
homeless while the case was on appeal.112 As word spread
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about the decision in Miami, other cities took stock of their own
practices. Fort Lauderdale, Florida stopped its “bum sweeps”113
and began encouraging its officers to refer the homeless to social services in lieu of making arrests.114

CONCLUSION
As America’s homeless population reaches five million
after Hurricane Katrina, Pottinger-type abuses such as those in
Las Vegas are to be anticipated unless society becomes proactive. Congress must reinforce incentives for constructing affordable housing and raise the minimum wage. Meanwhile,
“safe areas” must be available to those who have nowhere else
to go, and human resources must be provided to patrol those

areas to protect homeless men, women, and children from the
violence of the streets.
As America’s most vulnerable population, the homeless
must be afforded a “suspect class” designation. They are easily
identified and despised for characteristics they cannot readily
change. They have suffered the deprivation of the most fundamental rights because their very existence frightens the greater
population on a visceral level. The goal, however, is not only to
place the homeless in a better position to defend their constitutional rights, but to create a society that rejects “compassion
fatigue” in favor of indefatigable compassion and commitment115 to the welfare of even its poorest citizen.
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THE RUBRIC OF FORCE: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF SUBTLE BIASES AND JUDICIAL HOSTILITY
By Anand Swaminathan*

W

hen the United States Supreme Court instructed lower federal courts to enforce Brown
v. Board of Education1 “with all deliberate
speed,” it made “vagueness and gradualism” its
official policy for social advancement.2 Fifty years along the
path of gradualism, has our society lost the ability to make continuing progress in combating racial discrimination?
I argue that we have abandoned our commitment to the
quest for equal treatment, largely because we have failed to understand the evolving nature of discrimination. In this article, I
raise the notion of “force” as an overarching theme that provides
a means by which to understand the subtler nature of today’s
discrimination and provides renewed justification for the legal
regime used to combat it. This article situates the notion of
force within the employment discrimination context, partly to
define a reasonable and representative scope of study, but also in
response to the rich debate over the last ten years as to whether
Title VII and other statutes regulating discrimination in the
workplace should exist at all.

THE NOTION OF FORCE
According to civil libertarian legal scholar Richard Epstein,
Title VII is counterproductive because its inefficiencies cause
the overall economic pie to shrink, as companies hire fewer
workers and thereby decrease opportunities for those meant to
benefit from antidiscrimination laws.3 Epstein argues that the
market, operating without restrictions, would solve the problem
of discrimination by accruing competitive advantage to those
who do not maintain discriminatory practices. In Epstein’s
view, what small amount of discrimination remains is both tolerable and, in fact, productive.4
Richard McAdams presents an alternative economic theory
of discrimination termed status-production,5 which posits that
“discrimination and racist behavior generally are processes by
which one racial group seeks to produce esteem for itself by
lowering the status of another group.”6 Within this theory,
McAdams argues that discrimination will persist in competitive
markets even though discrimination is, from an economic perspective, inefficient and decreases overall wealth because it results in a diversion of resources and deadweight loss.7
McAdams presents three explanations as to why discrimination
will persist in competitive markets: (1) the power of discriminatory social norms, (2) the existence of “reciprocity” (restricting
social contact to ingroup members) between whites, and (3) under certain circumstances, the effect of esteem-producing racial
biases.8 According to McAdams, “the key to understanding
[discrimination and racist behavior generally] is to perceive its
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subordinating quality. Status comes about by disparaging others, by asserting and reinforcing a claim to superior social
rank.”9 These explanations highlight an important point: subordinating another group achieves greater esteem for the subordinator by denying the very act of derogation; hence, subtler forms
of discrimination are more effective than overt ones.
Epstein’s associational theory, by presenting a world in
which individuals look innately within their own groups to develop personal connections, lacks any coercive effect. On the
other hand, McAdams’ theory focuses quite acutely on the programmatic domination of one group by another. This focus on
force is crucial to the debate because it is force that provides the
strongest justification for state intervention. Epstein concedes
that state intervention was needed in the Jim Crow South, reasoning that the explicit use of physical violence and coercion
kept blacks from participating in markets.10 In his view, the
distinction between that period and the present one is the absence of state-sponsored force, a shift he identifies as occurring
in 1954 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education. I argue that Brown merely required a change in the
form of force. In a way, the coercive force has moved underground, and McAdams’ status production theory lays the foundation for a more thorough explanation of discriminatory behavior.
While McAdams’ language sounds of deliberateness, or
premeditation, in this article I consider the growing evidence
that subconscious biases contribute to discriminatory outcomes,
and place this dynamic within the broader notion of force. In
doing so, I reject Epstein’s sterile, almost placid, treatment of
these phenomena as part of innate associational “preferences” or
“tastes.” Epstein states that Brown led to cultural and social
changes to the very fabric of the South and asserts that this
change resulted in a drastic reduction in the use of force that
eliminated the need for legal intervention in combating discrimination. He does not consider the possibility that previously acceptable behaviors would not be abandoned but rather replaced
by new, subtler forms of subordination. To establish the persistence of force through new forms, then, would be to lay a strong
challenge at the feet of Epstein and others who concede that
state intervention was warranted in the Jim Crow South, but
argue that such intervention is no longer needed today.

LINGERING FORCE: COGNITIVE
BIASES AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES
The discriminatory behavior of whites in McAdams’ theory
is understood as serving to produce and maintain social status.
To this end, despite the influence of competitive markets, whites
21

use discriminatory social norms and what McAdams terms reciprocity. This behavior of whites, in McAdams’ approach, is
treated as purposeful or intentional. However, these same
means, and resulting end, may be compounded by implicit attitudes and unintentional motivations. Indeed, they may even be
the result of healthy cognitive functioning. A study of these
forms will buttress McAdams’ theory of status production while
providing further evidence of ongoing force unaccounted for in,
and contrary to, Epstein’s assumptions.
COGNITIVE BIASES AS FORCE
Linda Hamilton Krieger’s 1995 article, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, presents a detailed study of
behavioral research on cognitive biases and their implications on
established legal doctrine.11 Krieger explains that in the 1970s,
psychologists began to recognize that intergroup biases could
result not only from motivational processes but also from typical
cognitive processes. Called social cognition theory, psychologists began to identify “normal” cognitive processes like categorization and information processing that could also create and
reinforce racial biases.12 According to this view, stereotyping is
a cognitive process, resembling categorization, that alters perception, interpretation and other forms of information processing in predictable ways.13
Social cognition theory suggests that individuals who may
not harbor racist beliefs may nonetheless suffer from unintended
but systematic prejudice as a result of categorization-like stereotypes. Behavioral experiments have shown that when individuals are divided into groups, even for trivial or random reasons,
they display strong biases in their perception of differences and
in the evaluation and reward of ingroup versus outgroup members.14 Subjects perceive ingroup members as more similar and
outgroup members as more different than when those same persons are viewed in the absence of groupings. In addition, subjects are better able to recall undesirable behavior when committed by outgroup members instead of ingroup members, significantly overrate the product of their own group in comparison to
that of outgroups, and disproportionately attribute ingroup members’ failures to situational factors (i.e. environmental or contextual factors) and outgroup members’ failures to dispositional
factors (i.e. personal attributes or traits).15
In addition to categorization-based biases, social cognition
theorists have also identified biases resulting from saliencebased cognitive distortions in perception and memory. Studies
have found that individuals judge the actions of minorities in
more extreme ways when they are token members of a group
than when they are members of a fully integrated group.16 In
one study, white males and females evaluated law school applications containing incidental indications of the applicants’ race.
Evaluators judged black applicants with strong credentials more
favorably than otherwise identical white applicants, and judged
black applicants with weak credentials less favorably than otherwise identical white applicants.17
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According to some theorists, these studies show that we pay
more attention to stimulus objects that are more salient or distinctive, and as a result more information about these objects is
perceived, encoded and stored in memory.18 Thus, because data
regarding such stimuli are more available to the perceiver, impressions formed under conditions of high attention have a
greater valence, positive or negative, explaining the polarized
evaluation phenomena.19 An alternative explanation of the polarization findings incorporates previous studies showing that
individuals perceive ingroup members as relatively heterogeneous, or complex, while they view outgroup members as relatively homogeneous.20 As a result, they have an increased appreciation of complexities in evaluating ingroup members and
greater awareness of the inadequacy of available information,21
and thus are more cautious in their judgments.22 In contrast,
evaluations of undifferentiated outgroup members are more
broad and inexact, generally either “good” or “bad.”23
The studies above regarding categorization and salience
constitute cognitive sources of stereotypes and schemas, acting
as a lens through which subsequent events are viewed. How do
these schemas influence behavior? A 1980 study using schoolage children examined the effect of social schemas on the interpretation of ambiguous information, presenting cartoon drawings and verbal descriptions of a scene in which one student was
poking a classmate in the back with a pencil.24 Asked to rate the
behavior of the offending student, the study found that switching
the race of the actor had a significant impact on the manner in
which the children categorized the behavior. Specifically, subjects judged the behavior of black actors to be more mean and
threatening, and less playful and friendly, while the opposite
result obtained when the actor was white.25
A further example of schematic distortion affects how we
attribute causes to events. This analysis expands upon research
regarding “fundamental attribution error,” in which people tend
to underestimate the impact of situational factors and overestimate the impact of dispositional factors.26 A variation on this,
known as the “ultimate attribution error,” relates directly to the
categorization-based biases identified above, showing that people tend to attribute desirable ingroup behaviors to internal, dispositional factors but attribute similar behavior by outgroup
members to environmental causes.27 One such study found that
subjects perceived misconduct to be more likely to recur where
the behavior was in accordance with stereotypes of the actor’s
ethnicity than when stereotype-inconsistent or stereotypeneutral.
Furthermore, when misconduct was stereotypeinconsistent or stereotype-neutral, subjects were better able to
recall information about surrounding life circumstances of the
transgressor.28
In the employment setting, the implications of these studies
on how cognitive processes shape perceptions and influence
behavior are numerous. Racial minorities are more likely to be
alienated as a result of overperceived differences and are more
likely to have their work undervalued as compared to that of
majority (ingroup) members. In addition, any mistakes they
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make at work weigh more heavily in their supervisors’ minds
and are more likely to be attributed to personal, and not situational, factors, and hence result in more negative personal judgments. These concerns are only exacerbated by salience-based
distortions, such that racial minorities in predominantly white
employment settings are susceptible to evaluation in the extremes. While the data also shows that their successes are also
viewed more positively, the net effect may only be more alienation from co-workers.
In this setting, where there appears to be little room for error for racial minorities in the cognitive minds of their employers, the studies also show that minorities do not get the benefit
of the doubt. Instead, in the plethora of ambiguous circumstances that can arise in the workplace, existing schema and
causal distortions will act to place a thumb on the scale against
minority employees. That is, it is likely that a racial minority
involved in a verbal dispute in the workplace will not be seen as
passionate or playful but aggressive and threatening; and, this
aggressive and threatening behavior is more likely to be attributed to individual character than surrounding circumstances. In
this way, the conduct will appear worse, present less opportunity
for mitigation or rehabilitation, and thus result in more drastic
consequences. Without ever injecting motivational or intentional racial attitudes, cognitive biases present the possibility of
just such a playing field. This series of cognitive operations in
the minds of employers did not cease the day Brown v. Board of
Education was decided, nor did it cease the following day.
IMPLICIT ATTITUDES
The operation of force via subtle, often subconscious and unknowing, discrimination is further evidenced through tests
measuring explicit versus implicit attitudes. Generally, these
tests show that even individuals who believe that they hold no
prejudices towards racial minorities nonetheless harbor such
negative attitudes at a strikingly high rate.29 Unlike the cognitive bias studies discussed above, which focused on biascreating effects (or byproducts) of otherwise normal cognitive
functioning, implicit attitudes tests allow for the inference that
individuals who believe they hold no negative racial prejudice
nonetheless harbor such attitudes as the result of social conditioning and cultural or other experiential factors. While sharing
the unintentionality of cognitive biases, implicit attitudes can be
seen as closer to overt discrimination in that they reflect learned
behavior or the suppression of previously held overt attitudes.30
They may also be confirmation of the cognitive bias effect, reflecting the inevitable progression of cognitive-based stereotypes or schemas into implicit attitudes. Either way, implicit
attitudes present a second way of capturing the subtle force that
continues to operate in the post-Brown era.
Implicit Association Tests (hereinafter “IAT”) are a method
of indirectly measuring the strengths of associations among concepts.31 IATs are presented on web-based computer interfaces
in which instances of four concepts must be sorted using only
two options, each of which is assigned to two concepts.32 The
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IAT rationale is that people will find it easier to sort a pair of
concepts when they are closely associated than when they are
weakly associated. Ease of sorting is indexed both by the speed
of responding and the frequency of errors, where faster responding and fewer errors indicate stronger associations. Basically, if
you respond faster when “white” and “good” are paired than
when “black” and “good” are paired, your score would reflect a
preference for whites.33
Immediately prior to taking the IAT, subjects are asked to
complete a short questionnaire asking about their explicit preferences among the concepts used in the upcoming IAT and including basic demographic information.34 In this way, IATs are able
to compare conscious, explicit attitudes against unconscious,
implicit ones. One study, conducted on the original IAT website
between October 1998 and April 2000, consisted of 541,696
interpretable tests,35 of which approximately 221,000 responses
were black-white racial attitudes tests (both name and facebased).36 Analysis of the preference among test takers found
that 73% of test-takers automatically favor white over black, and
as many as 88% of test-takers showed either pro-white or antiblack preferences.37 On the explicit measure, whites showed a
preference for white over black, but black respondents showed
an even stronger preference for black over white. However, on
the implicit measure, whites showed a strong preference
(significantly stronger than the magnitude of explicit preference)
for white, while black respondents showed a weak preference
for white over black.38
New studies that place the IAT in various contextual settings supplement the notion of environmental factors as the
source of implicit attitudes and raise possibilities as to how we
can combat the effects of these biases. Studies have shown that
situational factors, like receiving the IAT from a black experimenter or being shown pictures of, or made to think about, admired black individuals like Martin Luther King, Jr., Michael
Jordan, and Bill Cosby, can lower bias scores.39 Similarly, testtakers display reduced implicit gender biases when asked to reflect beforehand on certain questions, like “What are strong
women like?”40
In terms of implications on actual behavior, one study found
that those test-takers who showed the strongest implicit racial
biases, when given the option of working with a white or black
partner, tended to choose a white partner. Another experiment
found that those who showed strong implicit preference for heterosexuals over homosexuals were more likely to avoid eye contact and show signs of unfriendliness when introduced to someone who they were told was gay. Finally, a German study found
that volunteers whose results suggested more bias against Turks
(an immigrant group in Germany) were more likely to find a
Turkish suspect guilty when asked to make a judgment about
criminality in an ambiguous situation.41
While critics of both cognitive bias and implicit association
theories exist, these studies are oft-repeated and consistent with
traditional laboratory findings.42 Moreover, in analyzing the
results of various experiments simulating different hiring-related
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decisions, their explanatory power is tremendous. For example,
in 2003, Bertrand and Mullainathan conducted a now-famous
study in which Boston and Chicago-area employers were sent
fictitious resumes that were identical except for interchanging
African-American and white applicant names.43 The study
found that applicants with white-sounding names received fifty
percent more callbacks from potential employers.44 Another
famous study analyzed the hiring practices at eight leading orchestras dating back to the 1960s.45 In response to concerns of
gender bias in hiring, many orchestras in the 1970s and 1980s
shifted from conductors hand-picking new members to a blind
jury-selection process in which applicants performed behind a
screen in order to conceal their identity, creating a unique opportunity to test for gender-biased hiring. The use of the screen led
to a 50% increase in women advancing out of the preliminary
rounds and a 30% increase in their chances of being hired in the
final rounds.46
Although interconnected, it is important to recognize that
the source of cognitive biases and implicit associations are presumably different. In one case, it is the cognitive processes that
are considered healthy and crucial; in the other, it is the absorption of cultural and situational norms. Together, they demand a
shift in focus from our words and thoughts to our subconscious
motivations. Moreover, the force of cognitive biases is particularly powerful because of where this manifestation occurs: at the
subconscious level. Greater esteem is achieved for a subordinating group when it can deny the act of subordinating, making its
status appear innate or natural, as opposed to constructed.
IMPACT OF SUBCONSCIOUS BIAS ON
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
By placing the operation of force, at least in part, at the cognitive level and recognizing that even individuals who do not
intend to discriminate are nonetheless influenced by implicit
biases, it is possible to argue that discrimination is not the exception but the rule in today’s workplace. Decisions in which
ambiguity and subjectivity are abundant are highly susceptible
to the influence of bias. In the employment setting, subjective
decision making is commonplace. So, how much discrimination
occurs in the workplace?
Survey data on personal experiences with employment discrimination suggest that while discriminators may not recognize
that their decisions are clouded by subtle, subconscious biases,
victims do. According to national Gallup polls, the percentage
of African Americans reporting that they were discriminated
against “at [their] place of work within the last 30 days varied
between 21% and 18% for the years 1997 through 2001.”47
Thirty-three percent of African Americans and Latinos reported
that at least one time at their job, they were not offered a job that
a white person got because of racial discrimination, and thirtyone percent reported being passed over for a promotion that was
offered to a white person because of racial discrimination.48
Researchers at Rutgers University conducted a 2002 study
focused specifically on employees and found that 10% of em24

ployees said they had been “treated unfairly at their workplace
because of their race or ethnicity.” Among this group, 28% reported being passed over for promotion, 21% reported being
assigned undesirable tasks, and 16% reported hearing racist
comments. Among African Americans, over half of those surveyed “knew of” discrimination in the workplace in the last
year, and 28% had themselves experienced racial discrimination
in the last year. Given the pervasive nature of subtle forms of
discrimination and the tiny percentage of employees perceiving
discrimination who actually file claims, one begins to wonder
not why there are so many employment discrimination claims
but why there are so few.49
Admittedly, other scholars have considered the meaning of
these subtle forms of discrimination on employment relationships and the surrounding legal regime.50 My effort here is to
place these ideas within a more comprehensive framework for
understanding how discrimination operates in our society. More
narrowly, I hope these studies rebut the fallacy of Epstein’s
force-free, post-Brown America.

MARKET FORCE: HOW BUSINESS CYCLES
EXERT DISCRIMINATORY FORCE
Here, my endeavor is to consider the relationship between
market fluctuations and other force phenomena, including the
subtle biases discussed above. The employment setting is an apt
one for the study of force. For one, it is an area in which discriminatory behavior has been historically pervasive. Moreover,
the plethora of data and statistics available for study provide a
practical reason for studying employment discrimination.
By way of background, in order for a complaint of discrimination to become a lawsuit in federal court, an employee must
first file a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). After a brief investigation, the
EEOC determines whether a case is worth pursuing. If so, it
may work with the parties to obtain a settlement or sue on behalf
of the employee. In all other cases, the EEOC issues a “right to
sue” letter to the employee, at which point an aggrieved employee can file a lawsuit in federal court.51 Thus, the two major
sources of data are the EEOC’s Annual Charge Statistics and the
Judicial Facts and Figures maintained by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts.52
The intuition regarding the relationship between business
cycles and employment discrimination is simple: when unemployment rates are low, jobs are available in abundance, so employees who experience discrimination have attractive alternatives to litigation; when unemployment rates are high, jobs are
scarce and employees will stay put in a discriminatory work
setting, at least for a while. Meanwhile, employers concerned
about turnover and associated costs have fewer incentives to
prevent such treatment during periods of high unemployment,
when they can easily find attractive candidates to replace aggrieved employees. A separate factor supporting this expected
effect is that periods of greater unemployment will inevitably be
accompanied by a greater number of discrimination-inducing
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events – that is, layoffs and firings.53
Economists John Donohue III and Peter Siegelman conducted a comprehensive empirical study of the explanations for
fluctuations in the amount of employment discrimination litigation, based on data from 1970-1989.54 In part, Donohue and
Siegelman were trying to understand why employment discrimination lawsuits in federal court grew 2166% from 1970-1989
while the general civil caseload only grew only 125% over the
same period. As an initial matter, they found that the volume of
employment discrimination displayed two patterns: (1) a general
upward trend in the long- term, and (2) erratic fluctuations
around this trend in the short-term.55 They also found that the
combination of upward trend over time and the lagged unemployment rates explained 96% of the variance in the number of
suits.56
Applying a similar series of regressions to quantify the impact of various factors likely to contribute to the long-term, upward trend,57 Donohue and Siegelman concluded that almost
20% of the increased volume of employment discrimination
litigation over the period from 1970-1989 could be explained by
rising unemployment.58
In one sense, unemployment rates themselves contain a
racially discriminatory component. Research shows that nonwhite workers experience a significantly higher rate of unemployment than white workers. Unemployment rates among African Americans and Latinos are consistently higher than for
whites, and African Americans in particular have consistently
experienced approximately twice the level of unemployment as
whites.59 In this way, unemployment rates exert market force
through their inherently racially-disparate functioning. In the
following section, I delve deeper into market operations to consider how shifts in the unemployment rate may catalyze and
exert force. .
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND EMPLOYER
BEHAVIOR AS FORCE
As economists acknowledge, weak labor markets may create an incentive for employers to “indulge in discriminatory
preferences” as a result of the excess supply of labor, with an
available pool of workers that presumably includes many talented and qualified workers. Employers may also see economic
downturns as an opportunity to weed out minority employees
who they perceive as underperforming or problematic by urging
them to quit. Economists question this incentive by pointing to
the high cost of firing, suggesting that the costs of potential employment discrimination litigation create a disincentive to behave in a discriminatory manner, and thus neutralize the labor
availability effect.60 However, this theory rests on the assumption that a significant portion of individuals who are discriminated against will actually bring claims. The assumption is
hasty.
In the Rutgers survey, discussed in Part II, supra, 34% of
those who reported racial discrimination in the workplace did
not do anything, and only 3% said that they actually sued their
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company or co-worker. Among African Americans who perceived discrimination, less than 1% (0.85%) actually filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, and less than one quarter of one
percent (0.22%) actually file a federal lawsuit.61 Indeed, an employer seeking to push people out could be quite successful in
doing so without facing a lawsuit: at least four times as many
people will quit than file a formal complaint with the EEOC,
and 16 times as many will quit than file a suit in federal court.62
Donohue and Siegelman engage in an extensive analysis of
EEOC and federal court data to address the possibility of increased employer discrimination during periods of high unemployment.63 They conclude that no such rise in discriminatory
behavior occurs among employers.64 In support of their conclusion, Donohue and Siegelman identify several empirical findings that contradict the causality of employer behavior. First,
they posit that the federal government would not experience
incentives to discriminate in the way private employers would,
and thus data showing that suits against the federal government
follow the same unemployment-related pattern as suits against
private employers can only be attributed to the worker benefits
effect.65 Second, they note that the upswing in employment
litigation begins within one or two quarters of the economic
downturn, though it usually takes longer to satisfy the administrative and procedural requirements for filing suit in federal
court, suggesting that increased federal court filings are based
on complaints filed with the EEOC prior to the upswing in unemployment rates (and any associated increase in employer discrimination).66 Third, they find that while the number of federal
court filings increase in recessions, the number of EEOC
charges remains relatively constant, a pattern inconsistent with
increased employer discrimination.67
Having laid out their argument against increased employer
discrimination, Donohue and Siegelman go on to hypothesize as
to the empirical results one may expect to find as a result of a
worker benefits effect, eventually showing that the predicted
results do indeed occur. Under a worker benefits effect, periods
of higher unemployment lead to increased durations of unemployment, and therefore greater backpay awards. Larger damage awards result not only in the established increase in litigation, but also make cases with a lower probability of success
more attractive by increasing the possible rewards of successful
litigation. Indeed, looking at figures from the same period,
Donohue and Siegelman find a small decrease in plaintiff win
rates and larger damages awards as unemployment rates rise.68
In sum, Donohue and Siegelman create a seemingly impenetrable argument rejecting the employer behavior effect and lending
strong support for a worker benefits effect.69
Nonetheless, I advocate for caution in interpreting their
findings. While the strength of their argument rests in its reliance on empirical support from employment litigation data, so
too may its weakness. I argue that documented evidence of judicial hostility to employment discrimination litigation may very
well poison the well of federal court data used in their findings.
This hostility calls for a reinterpretation of their data to consider
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the possibility of increased employer discrimination during economic downturns.
MARKET FORCE AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
The worker benefits effect essentially argues that, in economic downturns, relatively little changes besides the cost calculus of employees. Even assuming this is true, I argue that the
worker benefits effect should be understood within the rubric of
force. The fact that longer durations of unemployment make it
more economically viable to bring a claim does not, in and of
itself, imply that employees are bringing weaker or more frivolous claims. Indeed, the very nature of backpay awards creates a
wage threshold whereby high-earning victims of discrimination
are more likely to find it worthwhile to sue than low-earning
workers. The marginally lower-earning worker whose claim is
made worthwhile by the increased length of unemployment is no
less meritorious. Instead, valuing a discrimination claim based
on the length of unemployment, rather than the actual discriminatory conduct, merely highlights the unfortunate impact – call
it force – on low-wage victims of discrimination as a result of a
backpay-based remedy structure. After presenting evidence of
judicial hostility in the next section, I consider whether victims
of discrimination are penalized for bringing their claims during
periods of high unemployment .

JUDICIAL HOSTILITY TO EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
In 1997, the Second Circuit instituted a task force to study
the issue of gender, racial, and ethnic fairness in its courts.70
Generally, the task force began by surveying judges, court employees and attorneys about their observations of gender, racial,
and ethnic bias in the courthouse. In regards to bias directed at
attorneys, the survey found that judges observed almost no racial or ethnic bias against minority attorneys, an observation
shared by white male and white female courtroom employees.71
Among minority law clerks and courtroom deputies, on the
other hand, 24% reported observing a minority attorney's competence challenged because of his or her race or ethnicity, and
19% report observing a minority attorney mistaken for a nonattorney.72 Among minority attorneys, 39% reported that they
"often" or "occasionally" observed various kinds of incidents of
racial or ethnic bias directed at minority attorneys, including
derogatory racial or ethnic comments; 46% reported being ignored, interrupted, or not listened to; and 52% had been mistaken for a non-attorney.73
As previously noted, employment discrimination litigation
in federal court increased by 2166% from 1970-1989, versus a
125% increase in the overall civil caseload. Between 1992 and
1997, the volume of discrimination cases nearly doubled.74
Meanwhile, judicial attitudes toward employment discrimination
litigation reflect what can only be described as disgust. In a
1994 New York Times article, a former federal judge complained
that discrimination cases are an unjustifiable consumer of judicial time because they are “rarely settled, are characterized by
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high levels of acrimony and subjective claims of victimization;
they are immensely time consuming and are controlled by legal
standards that, lacking sufficient precision, are overgeneralized
and of marginal use.”75 The Second Circuit Task Force found
that other judges privately agreed that the Times’ article captured the views of colleagues who felt the cases were "small
potatoes," clogging up the federal courts and diverting judges'
attention from larger, purportedly more significant, civil cases.76
Statistically, in the few employment discrimination cases
that do make it to trial,77 plaintiffs are almost twice as likely to
win before a jury as they are in a bench trial.78 From 1990 to
2001, plaintiffs’ win rates before juries ranged from 36-44%
while win rates before judges ranged from 14-33%.79 Despite
plaintiffs’ minimal chances of making it to trial and obtaining a
favorable decision, they fair even worse on appeal. In fact, the
differential between plaintiff and defendant success rates is
greater in employment discrimination cases than any other category of civil cases.80 When an employment discrimination defendant wins at trial and the case is reviewed on appeal, only
5.8% of those judgments are reversed. By contrast, when an
employment discrimination plaintiff wins at trial and the case is
reviewed on appeal, 43.61% of those judgments are reversed.81
Looking solely at post-verdict defense motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, proceedings with historically low
rates of success, five out of six such appeals resulted in reversals
in the Second Circuit from 1992 through 1995.82
In a sense, these results are not surprising. There is little
reason to believe that federal judges, who are predominantly
white and the majority of whom are men, are any less susceptible than the general population to cognitive or implicit biases in
decision making. Perhaps, part of the problem can be attributed
to a legal regime that is too onerous on plaintiffs and inconsistent with the realities of modern discrimination. In sum, anecdotal evidence of judicial attitudes, lower win percentages at
trial before judges than juries, and the widespread perception of
bias among minority employees (and attorneys), all evince a
certain judicial hostility toward employment discrimination
claims.
A CRITIQUE OF DONAHUE AND SIEGELMAN
Donohue and Siegelman fail to account for evidence of the
increasingly aggressive use of summary judgment by defendants
in the area of employment discrimination.83 In light of the evidence discussed above, summary judgment effectively precludes
the jury’s opportunity to perform its traditional duty while simultaneously transferring authority to hostile judicial decisionmakers.
Donohue and Siegelman argue that increased rates of settlement and decreased plaintiff win rates at trial during periods of
high unemployment lend support to the worker benefits effect.84
Assuming as they do that “weaker” claims (defined as those
with lower probabilities of success) represent the majority of
additional cases during market downturns, and that weak claims
are likely to settle, increased rates of settlement and lower win
THE MODERN AMERICAN

rates at trial support their theory.85 However, given the growing
success of employer motions for summary judgment, in conjunction with the proposal that the incremental, or additional,
recessionary claim is weaker, employers should seek and win a
greater number of summary judgment claims. Therefore, a better test of whether weaker claims are brought during recessions
would study whether rates of summary judgment increased during periods of high unemployment.86 Correspondingly, rates of
settlement should have a smaller, or negligible, correlation with
high unemployment. Any actual increase in settlements, then,
or findings showing a lack of correlation between summary
judgment and increased unemployment, may instead reflect a
greater quantity or magnitude of employer discrimination.87
Similarly, we know it is a rare employment discrimination plaintiff who refuses settlement, overcomes a motion for summary
judgment and makes it to trial;88 presumably even rarer would
be such a result for one who brings an incrementally “weaker”
claim during a period of high unemployment. Among the few
cases that make it to trial, then, the win rates should remain relatively constant. Lower plaintiff win rates, in turn, may reflect
judicial animosity.89
One may be skeptical of the idea that judges are intentionally hostile to claims of discrimination, but subtle biases provide
a way of understanding observed judicial hostility to employment discrimination litigation as the result of subconscious influences. Unlike cell phones and cameras, subconscious biases
are not checked at the courthouse door. In fact, the differing
perceptions of discrimination toward minority employees by
white versus minority employees in the workplace90 are consistent with the differing perceptions of discrimination towards
minority attorneys by white versus minority attorneys and courtroom employees in the courthouse.91 Indeed, law clerks and
courtroom employees identified behaviors that would reflect the
operation of categorization-induced biases and negative schemas, including challenges to the competence of minority attorneys and mistaken assumptions that they were non-attorneys.
The intentional-sounding theory presented previously, in
which employers increase discriminatory force during periods of
high unemployment, can be presented in nonmotivational terms.
Employers seeking to make workforce reductions in order to
take advantage of the large labor pool will likely seek to push
out those who are seen as difficult or as underperformers.
Again, this determination itself would be influenced by previous
judgments contaminated by subtle biases. In a recession, choosing whom to terminate among a group of adequately performing
individuals introduces greater ambiguity, and hence greater susceptibility to the effects of cognitive biases. Finally, subtle biases may also interact with market forces through the behavior
of co-workers. Innate ingroup preferences are likely to serve an
unknowing status-producing end among white employees, such
that individuals who are socially isolated from their work teams,
who are more likely to be outgroup employees, would be most
vulnerable.
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These dynamics, if associated with market downturns, could
cast doubt on Donohue and Siegelman’s findings. For example,
employer behavior in market downturns may place increased
pressure on a set of vulnerable employees without increasing the
number of total employees subject to discrimination, explaining
the lack of cyclicality in EEOC charges. Similarly, employers
may take small steps to reduce costs or take advantage of increased labor in anticipation of market downturns and associated increases in unemployment. If so, the upturn in employment litigation within only two quarters after the onset of market
downturns92 may be consistent with increased employer discrimination. While these dynamics present a rebuttal to
Donohue and Siegelman, when understood in full they present a
way of understanding the relationship between subtle biases,
employer behavior and market conditions.

A FORCE-BASED PRESCRIPTION
Through cognitive and implicit biases, we learn that negative racial attitudes are pervasive and affect decision-making on
all levels, even among those who genuinely believe they are
acting in a race-neutral manner. The employment setting,
wrought with ambiguous and subjective decision making at all
stages of interracial interactions, from hiring to firing, raises
basic questions about the sort of remedy, and proof structure,
that should be implemented to combat such discrimination.
The two major frameworks used to argue workplace discrimination claims are disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Under disparate treatment, an employee must prove that the employer’s decision was motivated by a racially discriminatory
purpose. Under disparate impact, employees can forgo a showing of discriminatory purpose by identifying a facially-neutral
employment policy that has a disproportionate impact, or effect,
on racial minorities.93 In practice, neither adequately captures
the operation of subtle forms of force. Disparate treatment, with
its focus on intent, or purpose, is immediately deficient. Moreover, its traditional proof structure requires the identification of
a similarly situated member of another race who was treated
differently. Yet cognitive biases teach us that employers, unknowingly, may perceive differences in qualifications or performance between two virtually identical, or “similarly situated”
individuals as a result of ingroup versus outgroup status. This
difference will then be articulated as a challenge to the employee’s attempt to identify a similarly situated individual.
Disparate impact seems better suited to remedy discrimination rooted in the subconscious because of its substitution of
effect for intent. However, disparate impact theory, as applied
currently, is also problematic. First, it requires the identification
of a specific, facially-neutral policy or practice that constitutes
the source of the disparate impact. Decisions infused with biassusceptible subjectivity do not easily lend themselves to this
causal attribution. We are not talking about an employer policy
that says all employees must live within a two mile radius of
work; we are talking about interviews, performance reviews,
and everyday interactions that are capable of producing system27

atically-biased outcomes. Second, even if a causal relationship
between a specific practice and a racially disparate outcome can
be established, courts are likely to be extremely reluctant to tell
an employer that they cannot engage in many of these practices,
especially if the employer can prove that the practice is consistent with business necessity.
I argue for a bias-sensitive theory of discrimination in
which disparate treatment still provides the basic framework but
where the focus shifts from establishing that there was a discriminatory purpose to establishing that discriminatory biases,
explicit or implicit, permeated the employer’s decision. In the
process, evidence of racially disproportionate outcomes, divorced from any particular practices, could constitute a single
relevant factor in attempting to prove the role of force in decision making. The crucial components, however, are the relevant
facts and the inferences that can be drawn from them.94
By presenting a more accurate picture of how discrimination operates, force theory’s most useful contribution may be in
providing guidance as to what facts are relevant and what
weight should be given to each. For example, the cognitive bias
studies discussed above suggest that cases involving minority
employees who are in predominantly homogeneous groups,
where they are “token” members of their race, should raise red
flags. These employees are more likely to be victims of ingroup
preferences, are more likely to be judged negatively for ambiguous actions, and are more likely to be judged harshly for relatively minor performance deficiencies. Similarly, regardless of
the racial composition of the workplace, ingroup preferences
will often be proxied by particular negative assessments of outgroup employees. For example, social isolation caused by ingroup preferences may be seen as “not being a team player.” In
addition, the overall market conditions and unemployment rate
may also provide useful contextual information about the force
at play in the workplace at the time of relevant decision making.
Similarly, cognitive biases suggest that certain inferences
and presumptions should be given little or no weight in assessing whether force contaminated an employment decision. For
example, because studies show that outgroup members are more
likely to be judged in extremes, both positively and negatively, a
few highly-placed African American executives within a company would provide little evidence of non-discriminatory decision making. Similarly, evidence of bias in mental processing
would advocate for the abolition of the “same actor” presumption, a judicially-created legal standard holding that “where the
hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of
employment occurs within a relatively short time span following
the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a
determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer.”95 As a result of cognitive biases, it is perfectly plausible that a hirer would recruit a minority employee and then later
judge that individual negatively in various ambiguous situations
because of unknowing biases. Or, upon a single perceived deficiency or error by a minority employee, the hirer may subconsciously reorient the minority employee within a negative racial
28

schema that he had previously thought the employee transcended on the basis of her application or interview. In turn,
from that point forth, ambiguous situations are more likely to be
understood in a schema-consistent way and these schemaconsistent activities are more likely than schema-inconsistent
activities to be recalled by the hirer when making later firing,
promotion and demotion decisions. By presenting a more complicated picture of decision making, where subconscious considerations influence determinations, inferential shortcuts require
questioning.
Where factual circumstances play such an important role,
factfinders should be armed with the tools to properly weigh
relevant evidence. By training federal judges on their own hostility to employment litigation, statistical evidence of the prevalence of employment discrimination, and the impact of cognitive
biases on decision making, judges may be in a better position to
determine whether context-providing facts are relevant. For
example, courts may need to allow for more scrutinizing review
of past performance, placing a greater burden on employers to
justify negative determinations based on ambiguous conduct. In
addition, minority plaintiffs may be able to support an inference
of bias by applying the common disparate treatment strategy of
identifying ingroup members who were “similarly situated” but
treated differently (more favorably). Courts, in turn, must recognize the role of subtle biases in shaping the very determination of whether a given ingroup member was actually “similarly
situated.” As an example, an employer will likely deny that two
employees are similarly situated by citing the minority employee’s greater number of warnings/reprimands, or by identifying more negative performance evaluations. Yet, the differing
patterns of behavior may be nothing more than manifestations of
the employer’s subconscious biases. Therefore, courts should
engage in a thorough review of past actions that constitute negative assessments to determine whether biases have contaminated
employers’ very evidence of nondiscrimination. Similarly, coworker testimony as to these previous disputes may prove informative (and could warrant more or less weight depending on
ingroup or outgroup status, for example). Finally, the strikingly
common use of summary judgment is particularly disturbing, as
the notion of force illustrates that factual circumstances in the
employment setting are both complicated and conceptually crucial.
In the section above, I have tried to present some of the
implications of a broader notion of force on the current employment discrimination legal regime. Specifically, subconscious
biases and their relationship to judicial hostility present numerous concerns as to the type of inferences that can accurately be
made in interpreting fact patterns and the ability of legal decision makers - both judges and juries - to avoid the influence of
the very same biases they are tasked with assessing.
FORCE AND ROLE OF THE STATE
By engaging Epstein on the utility of the antidiscrimination
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are treated as an army of “private attorneys general.”99 Where
litigation is costly and the problem of discrimination is pervasive, placing the onus on businesses would serve to level the
playing field by at least aligning burden with resources.100

laws, a basic question arises as to the role of the state in regulating racially discriminatory conduct. Epstein’s approach is basically that of the laissez faire capitalist, arguing for a hands-off
approach in which discrimination will largely be eliminated by
markets because of the costs of discriminating. Under this approach, the Jim Crow South was an artificial construct and
Brown v. Board of Education was the normalizing event that, by
eliminating the state-sponsored exertion of discriminatory force,
returned markets to their “natural” state. The natural order restored, markets are poised to do their noble work of eliminating
inefficiencies and growing the pie.
The rubric of force presents a different view. Regardless of
whether a return to a state of nature can be achieved, the force
notion compels the view that such a state does not currently exist. Instead, implicit biases suggest that pre-Brown attitudes
may have found a new home in the subconscious. Cognitive
biases support this theory and further suggest that, at least as
long as there are identifiable ingroup and outgroup members, a
force-free state of nature may never exist.
As a final point, a view of subtle biases as potentially omnipresent suggests that, because of a dearth of truly objective actors, a seismic realignment of the current legal regime may be
needed. Where all employment decisions involving racial minorities are reasonably likely to be infected with racial bias,96
perhaps the presumption of nondiscrimination and the burden of
proof should be reversed. Indeed, the United States is in the
minority in its use of the at-will employment presumption.97
Canada bars dismissals that are “unjust” or not supported by
“just cause,” and nearly all European countries place a similar
burden of good cause for dismissal on employers.98
The force notion raises questions about the viability of a
model that shifts responsibility from the state to workers, who

CONCLUSION
Legal philosopher Robert Hale argues that coercive force is not
created through the application of government regulation or the
adoption of any particular legal rule. Rather, the total amount of
coercion remains constant while its distribution is shifted.101 For
example, the choice of a particular rule of property, while enhancing the rights of the property holder, simultaneously places
a restriction on the use of that property for all others. Contrary
to the suggestion by free market advocates that state regulation
is the creation of coercion upon private parties, in reality these
free market proponents simply advocate for a state of affairs in
which the balance of coercion is struck at one extreme, which
inevitably favors those with the most capital. While the capitalists run amok, racial minorities are subject to the coercive force
of history, culture, and cognition.
In the employment discrimination setting, antidiscrimination laws ensure that the balance is not set at the free
marketers’ extreme, but racial minorities nonetheless labor under too heavy a burden. Vulnerable to the cognitive bias and
implicit attitudes of employers, the current balance places the
onus on victims of racial discrimination to police what is a pervasive societal ill, permeating our collective subconscious, with
little help. The status quo asks racial minorities who suffer discrimination in the workplace to seek redress in an unknowingly
hostile judicial forum through the use of a set of clumsy legal
rules that misunderstand the nature of the problem. If equality is
a goal that our society values, a new balance must be struck.
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ssentially, Walter Benn Michaels is correct:
there is sharp class division in America that is
characterized by gross inequality of opportunity
and goes virtually unchallenged in the political
mainstream. In his latest book, “The Trouble with Diversity:
How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality,”
Michaels suggests that this lack of attention is rooted in our collective obsession with racial and cultural diversity. He proposes
that, instead of fixing the problems of a poor underclass created
by the free market economy, Americans choose to pursue solutions to inequality by focusing upon “diversity.”
Michaels acknowledges that within the poor, some are racial minorities, and some are not. He argues that if we solved
the issues of the disproportionate racial representation beneath
the poverty line, while the group would be a more appropriate
representation of races in that class of society, we would still
have the same number of underprivileged people. The end result, he argues, is that nothing is accomplished, but this is a
highly debatable conclusion. Michaels seems to believe that
race and gender-related inequality should be put aside in an effort to fix the country’s class issues. He often treats the two
concepts as though they are mutually exclusive. He urges
Americans to focus on eliminating the differences in wealth that
exist between the poor and the rich.
Ignoring race in the reconstruction of class, as Michaels
suggests doing, would support the imbalance of power that has
shaped America since its inception. When America pulls its
citizens from poverty, into real opportunity, racial discrimination may still leave people behind. Michaels does not seriously
engage in that particular dilemma, even vacillating about
whether racism actually exists in any significant form in America today.
In this vein, Michaels questions the legitimacy of identitybased considerations, such as affirmative action programs. In
what may be a determined effort to be shocking and cuttingedge, Michaels - a self-proclaimed liberal - comes dangerously
close to advocating the end of most current programs intended
to level the playing field for visible racial minorities.
If you can manage to put these problems aside, however,
what is left of “The Trouble with Diversity” is insightful and
thought provoking. Michaels suggests that the U.S. downplays
its growing economic divide by convincing citizens that the
country is actually still a meritocracy where, for example, the
brightest students go to the best schools. He also indicates that

the U.S. asserts that the rich and poor are equals, just culturally
different. By convincing the population of this, the United
States sidesteps the issue of actually creating equality of opportunity. The trick “is to think of [economic] inequality as a consequence of our prejudices rather than as a consequence of our
social system and thus to turn the project of creating a more
egalitarian society into the project of getting people” to stop
being bigoted.
His major proposal is for the abolition of private schools
and for the equal distribution of funding among public schools.
This would replace the present system, in which schools are
funded by local property taxes, which results in incredibly well
funded public schools in wealthy districts and dismally underfunded public schools in impoverished districts. Michaels believes that if the state can provide equal education to all, it
would advance the opportunity for class mobility for all Americans. However, as the Supreme Court has not looked kindly
upon efforts to eliminate private schools, this proposal will
likely remain nothing more than an interesting hypothesis in the
near future.
Michaels’s most important message is that focusing on racial and cultural diversity does not address true economic inequalities in the United States. Michaels suggests that “poverty”
is not an identity and does not fit under the “diversity” umbrella.
It is not African-American or Irish-American, but it is inequality. Americans need to fix it, not just find new ways to tolerate
it. His overall message is a good one, though his approach of
both downplaying the importance of race and recommending
wealth redistribution may turn off readers on both the left and
the right, respectively.
Still, “The Trouble with Diversity” is full of interesting
revelations and out-of-the-box thinking. The one notable failure
of the text, however, is that the author proposes engaging the
class problem at the expense of race, which remains another
significant dilemma in the U.S. As a result, Michaels engages in
the same sleight of hand of which he accuses the nation. While
he is quick to point out that America hides the economic divide
as it “celebrates diversity,” Michaels appears to make racial discrimination disappear while he focuses on issues of class. While
acknowledging the role that race plays in the equation is not as
simple as the contrast he suggests between the rich and the poor,
considering race is still not superfluous. It is necessary, and it is
incredibly complicated - and that is the trouble with diversity.

*Shannon Reaves is a first-year law student at American University Washington College of Law.
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ELECTING ONE OF OUR OWN:
THE IMPORTANCE OF BLACK REPRESENTATIVES FOR BLACK
COMMUNITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
By Royce Brooks*

O

n New Year’s Day 2005, the Tarrant County Commissioners’ Courtroom was at standing-room only
for perhaps the first time ever as hundreds of supporters gathered to watch Roy C. Brooks1, the
newly-elected Precinct 1 Commissioner, take the oath of office.
The candidate’s family had prime seats in the front two rows not only his wife, son, and daughter, but nieces and nephews
and in-laws, and brothers and sisters by blood and otherwise.
This day marked the achievement of a long-sought goal, not just
for the candidate, but also for his entire community of supporters.
There were quieter moments on the program: a gracious
speech by the outgoing commissioner, a brief tribute by one of
his community supporters, readings by a few more ministers.
Even the moment of official business was made personal as the
candidate was sworn in on the Brooks family bible, the same
bible in which his parents had recorded the names and birth
dates of their children years ago.
Finally, it was the candidate’s turn to speak. He called his
family up to the dais and introduced each person by name. He
thanked his brother, who was also his campaign treasurer. He
thanked his sisters for all of the time and support and, not least,
money that they had contributed. The crowd that came out to
celebrate Roy Brooks’ achievement did not tear themselves
away from their black-eyed peas just to congratulate a new commissioner — most of them probably had no idea what a commissioner actually does. They came out to celebrate something
much more important: that they had just elected one of their
own.

MAJORITY-MINORITY V. COALITION DISTRICTING:
THE DEBATE
The national debate over redistricting and effective minority
representation generally focuses on how best to draw Congressional and state legislative districts. The arguments both for and
against coalition districting2 take for granted the existence of
large-scale communities of interest among minority voters (i.e.,
that the vast majority of African Americans share common political interests) and ignore the reality of an aggregate power
component to the districts. Those in favor of coalition districting argue that minority influence in the aggregate legislative
body ultimately is more important than constituent satisfaction
with an individual representative. Scholars who are in favor of
coalition districting argue that blacks and other minorities will
be much better off when districting maximizes the number of
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legislators who are beholden to black communities for votes,
because their legislative issues will more likely be brought to the
table. 3 Under this theory, majority-minority districts, by packing more black voters into fewer districts, result in less effective
representation of blacks in the aggregate legislative body. This
leads to a ghettoization of black political issues, with only a few
voices willing to bring those issues to the fore. This view has
been gathering support for years, from proponents both black
and white, and on both sides of the congressional aisle.4
However, both scholars for and against majority-minority
districts fail to take into account local political concerns in their
arguments. The prevailing wisdom among those in favor of
coalition districting is that black constituents in a coalition district are better served by a moderate or conservative representative than a liberal representative, because the moderate will be
better able to garner support for key black issues in the aggregate legislative body. In this view, legislation dealing with issues of importance to the black community will have a better
chance of being passed under moderate or conservative representation, even if most black voters would prefer a much more
liberal representative. The problem with adding up black legislators and black-sympathetic legislators and judging success by
voting records and committee appointments is that voters are not
only worried about their statistical representation - the percentage of influence they wield within a national body. They are
also concerned whether the face of government with which they
deal regularly looks like them and reflects their experiences.
The redistricting debate is therefore incomplete without thorough consideration of pertinent issues from the local government perspective, where questions of representation and community identification most affect voters’ daily lives.
A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE
This article focuses on the 2004 campaign and election for
the Precinct 1 Commissioner’s seat in Tarrant County, Texas.
In a majority white county precinct in north central Texas, four
candidates competed for the slot: three black candidates battled
fiercely for the Democratic nomination, and the winner faced the
Republican candidate, also black, in the general election. Once
elected, Roy Brooks took his seat as the only black member of
the five-member Tarrant County Commissioners’ Court. This
article takes a ground-level view of one candidate’s campaign,
eventual election and initial days in office. The author explores
a number of questions. First, what circumstances did these
black candidates face as they struggled to distinguish themselves
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with black voters while still appealing to the white majority?
Second, how does the new black commissioner balance his or
her commitment to zealous representation of black community
interests with a commitment to the majority white constituency?
Third, how does the only black commissioner maneuver politically within such a small governmental body? Finally, what do
black constituents want from a black county commissioner?

the candidates themselves indicates that different approaches
and even different substantive methods are offered to each
group. This is a little-mentioned effect of coalition districting.
In a majority-minority district, a candidate hoping to represent
the views and experiences of a minority community would feel
free to campaign on those issues, instead of feeling pressured to
soften certain ideas for the benefit of an audience. In such a
district, it would be possible for a black candidate to win based
RUNNING AND WINNING: THE STORY OF A
on a platform of issues of importance to the black community.
COMMISIONER’S COURT RACE
In a coalition district, though, a candidate cannot win without
Tarrant County is the third-largest county in Texas. Ac- some white support. And that white support generally comes
cording to a 2001 census, its population was estimated at when black candidates successfully soften or dilute their black
1,486,392.5 With the population of neighboring Dallas County political messages to suit the palates of white voters.
at approximately 2.3 million6, the combined Dallas CountyElection law scholars acknowledge that minority voting
Tarrant County region, commonly known as Dallas-Fort Worth, cohesion and white crossover voting are important factors in
is one of Texas’ largest urban centers.
understanding whether black voters in a given district will sucRacially, Tarrant County is significantly more homogeneous cessfully elect their candidate of choice.7 In their 2001 article
than the rest of Texas, with a non-Hispanic white population of exploring effective minority districting, Bernard Grofman, Lisa
61.9%, compared with just 52.4% for Texas statewide. Eco- Handley, and David Lublin explain that relying solely on the
nomically, Tarrant is predominantly middle-class, but with a minority percentage in a district does not consistently predict
striking 10.6% of the county’s
black election success. Accordpopulation living below the poving to Grofman, Handley, and
erty line. Tarrant is also home to
Lublin, We also need to incorpoUnder this theory, majority-minority
the billionaire Bass and Monrate the level of minority cohesion
districts, by packing more black voters
crief families, whose oil fortunes
and the degree of white crossoare a consistent source of fundinto fewer districts, results in less
ever voting that can be xpected
ing for local civic projects.
when a minority-preferred candieffective representation of blacks in the
Of Tarrant County’s four
date competes for office. If, for
aggregate legislative body.
precincts, Precinct 1 is the most
example, white voters regularly
racially diverse. Whites make
cross over to vote for black candiup just 46% of the population of
dates, the percentage black necessary to create an effective black
Precinct 1, with blacks comprising 31% - two and a half times district decreases.8
the county average - and Latinos comprising 20%. Precinct 1 is
Conversely, if white voters regularly fail to vote for black
widely economically and socially diverse as well. The three- candidates, the black percentage necessary for black voters to
hundred thousand person area stretches from the apartment com- achieve their preferences in a district increases dramatically.
munities of southeast Fort Worth, where zero-tolerance police Despite moves toward pervasive crossover voting in nearby Dalpatrols break-up gatherings of brown and black men on dark- las, and despite the individual successes of a handful of promiened street corners, to the dream-home gated communities of nent local black candidates, white voters in Tarrant County still
southwest Fort Worth, where seven-bedroom palaces stand overwhelmingly prefer white candidates.9 “By and large, white
along privately financed, tree-lined avenues. Politics is no ex- voters do not vote for black candidates.” So says Art Brender,
ception to the pattern of wild diversity in Precinct 1. It is the Chairman of the Tarrant County Democratic Party. Brender,
only majority-Democratic precinct in the county.
who is white, knows well of what he speaks. As a civil rights
The Precinct 1 Commissioner’s race in 2004 was unique in attorney who has been involved in several of the recent Texas
that all the primary and general election candidates, both De- disputes over redistricting, Brender is also a life-long Tarrant
mocratic and Republican, were black. With a very popular com- County resident. As a result, Brender is intimately familiar with
missioner - the first black and the first woman ever to sit on the the voting patterns and political atmosphere of the region. But if
court - finally retiring after sixteen years in office, several black white voters do not vote for black candidates, what makes Precandidates raced to fill the void. Because a black commissioner cinct 1, with its succession of black commissioners and its slate
had held the office for so long, many voters and political opera- of black candidates running in a majority white district, an extives in Tarrant County have come to think of Precinct 1 as the ception? Brender points to five factors. First, the reluctance of
county’s unofficial black seat.
whites to vote for blacks is less prevalent among lower income
The difference between campaigning in black communities white voters, such as those who vote in the Democratic primaand campaigning in white communities is not merely one of ries. Second, in the past twenty years, many of the white voters
style. Everyone from campaign managers to party operatives to who would not be willing to vote for black candidates have
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switched from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Third,
because Precinct 1 has a higher percentage of white voters who
are Democrats than other areas of the county, there is likely less
of a racial voting effect by party than would be expected in other
areas, with all of the blacks voting for the Democratic candidate
and all of the whites voting for the Republican. Fourth, in this
year’s Precinct 1 race, the candidates were particularly attractive
to white voters, with recognized names and impressive records
of public service, including a sitting member of the Fort Worth
city council and the highly visible administrative assistant to the
popular incumbent commissioner. Brender especially emphasized name recognition as a positive factor for both Brooks and
Commissioner Bagsby before him. Finally, Brender acknowledges that what may be the most important factor is also the
simplest: all of the candidates were black, which diminished any
racial effect of voting by stripping white voters of any alternatives.
Despite his candid assessment of white voters’ view toward
black candidates, Brender is reluctant to admit that the county’s
Democratic Party operation might sometimes differentiate its
message on the basis of race. However, Brender does acknowledge that party workers might be more likely to emphasize civil
rights themes or include messages by leaders like Jesse Jackson
when campaigning in a black community, but not in a white or a
Latino community, where civil rights issues fail to resonate as
successfully.
The Brooks campaign was also sensitive to the charge of
inconsistency in campaigning (as well as, presumably, the more
disparaging charge of race pandering). As a result, both Brooks
and his campaign manager were reluctant to admit differentiating their message based on race. When asked whether his campaign ever delivered different messages to different communities according to race, Brooks replied, “We never altered the
basic message, but we may have shifted our emphasis on certain
issues in the overall platform.”10 Brooks had several issues that
formed the core of his campaign: improved health care, economic development, implementing a freeze on senior citizen
property taxes, and a general pledge to put his superior level of
experience and knowledge of county government to use for the
benefit of constituents without lapse in service from the previous
commissioner. In an election year when Bush’s characterization
of John Kerry as a “waffler” may have cost Kerry the presidential election, Brooks was well aware of the dangers of appearing
to be inconsistent. “You become liable to the charge of pandering to different interests,” says Brooks.11
When asked about the receptiveness of white voters to his
candidacy, Brooks noted that the senior citizen tax freeze certainly resonated in white communities because by and large,
white voters are higher income people and own more expensive
property than minority voters. Health care and economic development issues were aimed more toward black and Latino communities whose needs are much more basic and whose communities have not received the same support for basic infrastructure
- business development, healthcare, and the like. “[T]o a certain
Spring 2007

degree, there was a tailoring of the message. But I said the same
things in the white community,” said Brooks.
Brooks’ campaign manager, Charmaine Pruitt, had a similar
take on the question of message differentiation.12 When Pruitt,
who is black, was asked whether the campaign differentiated its
message according to race, she said that the message itself did
not change, but the emphasis did change in certain instances.
For example, in black neighborhoods, the campaign may have
focused more heavily on increasing outreach and service for the
county hospital system, which serves mostly indigent patients.
In white neighborhoods, the campaign may have focused more
on economic issues like capping the property tax for seniors.
The tension between messages that appeal in black communities and those that appeal to white voters is part of the reason
why, despite the evident ability of blacks to run and win in Precinct 1, many black voters in Tarrant County prefer the majority-minority model to the coalition district model. When asked
about the viability in Tarrant County of coalition districts that
rely on white crossover voting to elect minority candidates,
Brooks said,
I’m suspicious of the willingness of white
voters to apply that strategy across the board.
I think that [white crossover voting] is situational. I think this upcoming city council
election presents some interesting opportunities for crossover. Precinct 1 works because
Democrats are the majority in the precinct, but
blacks control the Democratic primary. It
would be interesting to research exactly why
blacks are allowed to control the primary.13
That the battle for the Democratic nomination was centered
in the black community is not just a consequence of black candidates playing up to black voters. In Tarrant County, as across
Texas and the rest of the south, large numbers of white voters
have turned to the Republican Party in recent years. As white
voters leave the Democratic Party and black voters remain,
blacks gain proportionately more voting power within the
party.14 Further, in Tarrant County, black voters are somewhat
more likely than white voters to participate in the Democratic
primary. Therefore, for the commissioner candidates, capturing
a significant number of black votes was essential to winning the
primary.15 According to Brooks, many white Democrats either
don’t vote in the primary or vote defensively by voting in the
Republican primary and voting Democrat in the general election.
When asked whether he would prefer redistricting in favor
of a smaller number of guaranteed majority-minority districts or
a larger number of coalition districts with the potential to elect
minority candidates, Brooks said that he would prefer the guaranteed seats: “I think that American society is still polarized,
and we vote for people who look like us. For people to vote in
patterns other than that is the exception, not the rule.” Perhaps
things will be different in the future, but Brooks has a clear assessment of the situation as it stands now: “I don’t think we
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have gotten to that place yet.

the county, such as volunteering at county hospitals. Bagsby
also started an immunization project with the local Junior
CONSTITUENT SERVICES: THE FOUNDATION OF
League through the county hospitals. Because of her efforts, the
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
county has become much more visible in the community Because of its size and function, questions of aggregate leg- county offices have adopted local elementary schools, and
islative power do not apply to the five-member Tarrant County county employees drive for Meals on Wheels and are encourCommissioners’ Court. The court is a governing body, not a aged to participate in other charitable efforts.
legislative body, and has no ordinance-making authority. InHaving assisted Bagsby’s successful administration for
stead, the county government operates as the local arm of the fourteen years, Commissioner Brooks takes constituent outreach
state government, and the Commissioners’ Court acts as the just as seriously as did his former boss. When asked what imcounty executive, exercising powers specifically delegated to it portance he attaches to constituent services as part of his overall
by the state government. According to Commissioner Brooks, job description, Brooks answers,
the court is authorized to “provide order and structure to the
When you hold office, you don’t operate
county government, to make policies that affect the local implein a vacuum, and you’re not there to serve
mentation for state programs, and to pay the bills.”16 Specific
your own needs, but to serve the needs of the
court mandates include the responsibility for operating the state
people who elected you. The only way to
criminal justice system, providing health care for the indigent,
know what the people want is to directly comimplementing programs for child welfare and mental health and
municate with the citizenry and get them inmental retardation services, bridging the gap for welfare recipivolved.18
ents between the application for assistance and the receipt of
Brooks therefore counts community meetings as among his
federal welfare benefits, and
most important commitments.
maintaining all non-municipal
His office hosts some meetings
For example, in black neighborhoods, the
roads.
and is invited to many more, from
campaign
may
have
focused
more
heavily
on
The court is presided over
neighborhood associations to
increasing outreach and service for the county
by the County Judge, which is a
senior citizens’ groups to
hospital system, which serves mostly indigent
county-wide elected position.
churches; he personally attends
patients. In white neighborhoods, the campaign two or three per month. In addiBecause the court does not elect
its own leader, party affiliation
may have focused more on economic issues like tion to these organized invitations
and other group identity does not
from the public, Brooks says his
capping the property tax for seniors.
come into play. Any separate
office is contacted “many times a
committee work handled by the court includes all five members
day” by constituents needing help with personal problems.
as a committee of the whole. With such a small group working
These include anything from a dispute with a landlord to a
so closely together, merely forcing initiatives through the system
family member in jail. Brooks tries to help them all, and will
based on one party’s superior numbers would make for uncomsoon add a staff member whose sole responsibility is commufortable working conditions. Instead, the commissioners must
nity outreach and constituent services.
maintain personal relationships with each other, and advocate
Brooks’ main programmatic goals for constituent services
for their constituents behind the scenes as well as on the vote are health care-oriented. Brooks wants to address local issues of
tally board. Additionally, because the court has limited author- health disparity between affluent communities and poorer, espeity to pursue policy-making on the kinds of political issues that cially minority, communities. He hopes to be able to direct the
engage most voters, court members are much more likely to be county-run health system into a community health model, and to
judged based on their relationships with their constituents than eliminate the county’s policy of treating undocumented patients
on what specific legislation they helped to pass or defeat.
only in an emergency room setting. Brooks is also in the procFor four-term commissioner Bagsby, Brooks’ immediate ess of creating a nonprofit entity to partner with community
predecessor and former boss, constituent service was a top prior- groups to apply for grants for community initiatives from SAT
ity.17 In addition to reaching out to citizens’ groups and holding preparation courses and summer youth camps to senior citizen
community meetings as she had during her initial campaign for programs. According to Brooks, “We’ll just have to see what
office, Bagsby took a programmatic approach to constituent the people want.”
outreach, beginning with publishing a citizens’ guide to county
HOW ELECTION LAW SCHOLARS
government, which included descriptions of the processes of
VERVALUE LEGISLATIVE POWER
O
county government and contact information to make services
For some, the coalition district model represents the triumph
more accessible to citizens. She initiated outreach efforts like
broadcasting the weekly court meetings on public access televi- of racial cooperation over the provincialism and polarization
sion, and she created a volunteer coordinator position to encour- that often characterizes contemporary politics. Richard Pildes
age citizens to become involved in charitable activities through presents coalition districts as an alternative to safe districts
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where whites and blacks have achieved “meaningful” political
cooperation.20 Some believe that this model is just right for
Texas, where political racial tensions are rooted in a history of
slavery and de jure segregation. Tarrant County Democratic
Party Chairman Art Brender has favored coalition districting
over majority-minority districting for many years. Brender
states, “I’ve said for a long time that the majority-minority
model is disappearing because of the upward mobility of blacks
and Hispanics in the region.”21 Brender further explains that
Tarrant County has seen a trend of generational dispersion
among black voters: children raised in traditionally black
neighborhoods like southeast Fort Worth are moving away from
those neighborhoods as adults. As a result, it is becoming
harder in Tarrant County to create separate majority-black voting districts. Brender sees coalition districts as the solution to
this problem. Although Brender admits that a coalition model
based on white crossover voting would be unlikely to succeed
locally, he believes that coalitions of local minority communities
based on common economic and social interests would be viable
vehicles for black candidates. For example, education issues,
economic issues, health care, and public transportation are common interests that unite black, Latino, and Asian communities in
the area, and serve as bases for potentially successful coalition
districting.
The story of multi-ethnic coalition districts is especially
popular among both election law scholars and Democratic Party
operatives, because it seems to suggest a clear solution for minority representation. Communities of underprivileged and marginalized minority groups would band together to elect representatives from each other’s communities; thus, helping each other
achieve fuller, more descriptive representation than any one
group could achieve on its own. Further, the Democrats could
count those seats as safely in the “win” column, meaning that
Democrats in the aggregate legislative body would have that
much more power, and would be in a better position to pass legislation of importance to minority communities. This fails to
take into account, however, that while minority voters would
prefer Democratic representatives to those of another party, the
effective representation debate neglects the fact that they may
prefer representation by a member of their own community
above all else. For example, Carol Swain concludes that black
voters value the constituent services and community solidarity
that a black Congressional representative provides, more highly
than they value the greater influence in the aggregate body that a
white representative might provide.22 Despite this finding,
Swain ultimately proposes that coalitional districting with white
representatives is the best solution for black community representation.23 One can only marvel at the willingness of even a
black academic, a member of the very voting community in
question, to disregard the opinions of black voters in her recommendations for achieving the most effective representation of
those voters.
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REALLY SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION: THE
IMPORTANCE OF HAVING “OUR GUY” IN OFFICE
In academic parlance, substantive representation exists
when a representative is effective in promoting a community’s
interests, regardless of whether that representative is a racial or
ethnic member of that community. In contrast, descriptive representation exists when a community’s political representative is
merely a racial or ethnic community member.24 In reality, however, for many black voters, there is no such thing as being
“merely” a racial representative. Racial identity is as important
a factor in representation as legislative success or party leadership. In the context of local officials who sit on small bodies or
hold lone executive positions, and whose official duties often
lack either the salience or the magnitude to resonate with most
voters, racial representation can be one of the most important
factors voters seek. A black representative offers the black community a social and emotional stake in the political process - the
existence of black officials shows the community that it is possible for other interested minorities to run for office and win.
From an academic perspective, a more accessible governmental
process and the establishment of officials as role models for a
particular racial community are secondary benefits, external to
the more important process of maximizing minority-sympathetic
votes in legislatures. For many minority voters, however, being
able to access government through an elected representative
from one’s own community is truly a substantive concern.
Does electing a black county commissioner really make for
better representation for black constituents? County government
is certainly not a high-profile enterprise, and many citizens, both
black and white, are completely unfamiliar with its mission. But
according to local community leader Deralyn Davis, having a
black representative in county government is “not just for show”
- it is vital to county policy.25 Commissioners are responsible
for appointments to boards and commissions that bring political
and monetary benefits to the black community. For example,
the Tarrant County Commissioners’ Court appoints members to
the John Peter Smith Hospital Board, which oversees a county
hospital system that serves a large percentage of low-income
and minority patients. Before Commissioner Bagsby was
elected, only one black member had ever been appointed to the
hospital board, despite the fact that black patients comprise approximately one-third of those served by the John Peter Smith
system. It was only after the election of a black commissioner
to the court that black members became a regular fixture on the
hospital board. Davis points out that a governing board is most
effective when its members contribute a variety of experiences
and ideals. Davis gives the example of her service as the first
woman to serve on the State Prison Board, appointed by thenTexas governor Mark white.26 Her suggestion resulted in portable toilets being brought into the fields where women prisoners
labored so that they no longer had to relieve themselves in public under the eyes of male guards. None of the male members of
the board had previously considered this problem. Similar con37

cerns of sensitivity and awareness arise in the context of the
Commissioners’ Court-appointed hospital board. It is hard to
know just how attentive an all-white board would be to the particular needs of its black patients.
Officials who are members of the minority communities
they represent have a real stake in the governing of those communities, because they will be personally affected by the outcomes of the decisions they make. And voters within a community feel a real connection to a representative who looks and
lives like them. According to Roy Brooks, “They feel like they
have a sort of ownership in me. They helped put me there.”27
Deralyn Davis sees this sense of personal connection in one’s
representative as an important part of political participation, and
she thinks that for Tarrant County, the coalition district model
threatens that feeling of connection for minority voters.
According to Davis, the coalition district model is unlikely
to be successful in electing black candidates, despite the exceptions of Bagsby and Brooks in Precinct 1. Both Bagsby and
Brooks gained support from a wide range of voters based on
individual appeal: both were from well-respected Fort Worth
families whose names tended to overcome doubt among white
voters, and both had relatively high profiles within the greater
Fort Worth community based on their professional experiences
before running for office. Not every black candidate has such
advantages when it comes to drawing crossover-voting support.
Davis fears that without a majority-minority model, black candidates will be unable to win locally, and black voters will lose
their already limited personal connections to representative government.
NAVIGATING A FIVE-MEMBER COURT:
ONE COMMISIONER’S STORY
In 1988, Bagsby was the only Democrat elected in Tarrant
County. Many of her supporters had backed her because of a
surrounding sexism controversy, not because they cared about,
or were familiar with, county government. One of her first acts
in office was putting together an informational pamphlet called
“County Government A to Z,” as one of her many efforts to
make the Court more accessible to citizens.
Bagsby felt a conscious responsibility to demonstrate that
women belonged on the Court and that a minority woman could
be a competent commissioner. At first, she experienced “both
covert and overt hostility” from some members of the court, so
she was careful to do her homework.28 Bagsby saw that the
boards and commissions that were appointed by the court were
not demographically reflective of the local community as a
whole, so she pushed for term limits for appointed positions and
nominated qualified minorities and women for vacant spots.
Bagsby says she knew that other court members were looking
for a reason to gang up against her, so she made sure always to
have one or two of them in partnership on any effort, and she
usually let one of the others present the idea in court meetings.
“That’s the way women work - they are consensus builders and
collaborators.”29 But she says it would have been hard for
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someone who needs public validation to operate in such a behind-the-scenes manner. Bagsby encouraged the court to take a
critical look at members of the county’s senior staff and evaluate
them objectively. She pushed for professionalization of the staff
with an eye toward encouraging the county’s operations to become technologically up-to-date, and she initiated a tuition reimbursement program for employees who wanted to pursue higher
education.
The primary goal of Bagsby’s first term in office was to
change the culture of the court; she did not push for change in
the delivery of services right away. But according to Bagsby,
despite the fact that the changes she initially pushed for were
mostly internal, she did not have a problem being satisfactorily
accountable to the black community. “They were just glad to
see me there every Tuesday,” she says.30
Initially, Bagsby’s fellow commissioners were less than
welcoming. Perhaps they resented having to share their authority with a black person and a woman. Perhaps they feared further encroachment from communities they felt uncomfortable
dealing with - once minorities and women started to take an interest in the court, how long would any of their seats be safe?
Unfortunately, it seems they had no cause for worry. In the sixteen years since Bagsby first ran for the court, no minority commissioner has been elected from any other precinct, and no black
candidate has ever run for a seat outside of Precinct 1. Instead,
Precinct 1 has become the black seat, the district in which it is
safe for blacks to run and win. There is a consistent minority
presence on the court, but it is sequestered in such a way that
white members of the court are safe from minority challenges.
Lani Guinier identified this type of problem in New York’s Village Voice,31 arguing that the limited minority presence allowed
by white elites in their various institutions both legitimizes those
institutions and insulates the elites from real competition from
minorities. She compares the Supreme Court’s ruling in Georgia v. Ashcroft32 with its handling of the affirmative action question in the Michigan cases33 and finds that in each case, the
Court leaves the ultimate choices of redistricting and student
admissions not to the taxpayer and the voter, but to the power
elite.
Precinct 1 seems to fit this model exactly.34 The 1990 and
2000 redistrictings each increased the proportion of black voters
in Precinct 1, consequently decreasing the proportion of black
voters in the other precincts. By 2004, with four black candidates vying for one commissioner seat, and zero black candidates running in any other race, it seems that the concerns of the
black community have been successfully relegated to one corner
of the commissioners’ court.

CONCLUSION
It is clear that, on the ground, the debate between majorityminority and coalition districting is far more complicated than
the mere amassing of districts to maximize the aggregate legislative clout of the Democratic Party. On a local level, black vot-
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ers do not define political efficacy only, or even primarily, according to policy implementation. Instead, they count constituent services and the ability to identify personally with their representatives as their most important concerns. Black voters,
therefore, experience the fullest political access, and receive the
best response from government, when they are represented by
black elected officials with the political freedom to pursue black
interests zealously. Coalition districts do not sufficiently allow

for this paradigm. Instead, when black candidates must please
both minority and white communities, they will differentiate
their political messages in order to appeal to white voters. Majority-black districts allow black communities to experience
ownership of the political process in a way that coalition districts do not. For the debate over effective minority districting
to be complete, election law scholars must fully take into account this sense of empowerment - the value of electing one of
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SPECIAL CREDIT PROGRAMS: A WELL-INTENTIONED IDEA
GONE BAD
By Luke Reynolds*
Every consumer deserves an equal
opportunity to access the credit
market, and that credit should never
be withheld because of sex or any
other factor not related to ability and
willingness to repay the loan.1

D

ecades ago, lenders could refuse to provide credit
to qualified borrowers based solely on arbitrary
characteristics such as race, religion, or sex.2
Moreover, when faced with equally creditworthy
loan applicants, lenders would charge certain borrowers higher
loan rates for no legitimate reason.3 Congress passed the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) 4 to forbid arbitrary discrimination.5 But, did the ECOA fully protect consumers from facing
discrimination on the basis of arbitrary characteristics?6
At the same time that Congress outlawed discrimination in
“any aspect” of a credit transaction on a prohibited basis, it specifically allowed “affirmative” discrimination on these same
grounds. Any such affirmative action credit program is called a
“Special Purpose Credit Program” (“SPCP”)7, known as the
consumer credit equivalent to affirmative action hiring plans.8
For instance, a disadvantaged Black applicant could legally be
turned down because of the color of her skin if she applied for
an SPCP designed for Native Americans.9 Both large and small
lenders currently offer SPCP programs that make credit available on preferential terms to certain groups.10
This article will not take a position on whether affirmative
action is constitutional or whether it is beneficial for society.
Rather, this article will argue that SPCPs are limited by equal
protection principles external to the ECOA. This question is
timely because “affirmative action” and equal protection law
have evolved in the 30 years since the ECOA and its SPCP provision was first passed. At least one law firm recently advised
its clients to be mindful of a challenge to the SPCP under civil
rights principles, in part, as a result of some of these changes.11
While the Federal Reserve Board is required to regularly review
and, if necessary, update the ECOA,12 the SPCP section has received only perfunctory changes.13 The Federal Reserve Board
is unlikely to mandate changes that negate the letter of the law
in any regulation, including the ECOA, as the Board’s role is
primarily to write regulations that implement the laws passed by
Congress.14
This article is intended to fill a necessary void and analyze
SPCPs in light of three decades of legal developments.15 Part I
will provide a brief history of applicable constitutional and civil
rights law, including the ECOA, to help the reader understand
the context for SPCPs, and introduce the reader to SPCP pro40

grams. Part II will propose a multi-step analysis and argue that
SPCPs are illegal under the equal protection clause. Part III will
propose two amendments to the ECOA to ensure that SPCPs are
available to satisfy special social needs without discriminating
against any protected class. Finally, Part IV concludes in support of fair lending enforcement to advance public policy interests.

BACKGROUND-THE EXISTING LAW
A. IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
1. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Equal Protection (“E.P.”) clause16 has evolved substantially during the twenty-first century, as it is considered to be a
“viable [and] powerful” strategy to challenge inequality.17 Simply put, the E.P. clause prohibits purposeful18 or “invidious discrimination.”19 Considering that certain classes or groups may
benefit more than others from virtually any government action,20
the courts apply one of three tests to assess the constitutionality
of a challenged behavior.21 An E.P. analysis is essentially identical under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,22 as the
primary difference is the level of government at issue.23 However, the actor need not be a state or federal entity. Private conduct is considered to be state action in several circumstances,
including conduct authorized by the state, which is significant
for this article. Unfortunately, the Court does not have a precise
test for state-authorized conduct, as it makes a determination
after weighing the facts in each case.24
2. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAW
An affirmative action program is designed to “change the
outward and visible signs of yesterday’s racial distinctions and
thus, to provide an impetus to the process of dismantling the
barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices.”25
The constitutionality of affirmative action programs is evaluated
under the equal protection clause because the equal protection
clause “protect[s] persons, not groups.”26 Tracing their origins
to New Deal-era labor laws,27 affirmative action programs
started in the employment context and later expanded to college
admissions.28 Affirmative action is largely court-defined, as it is
not expressly authorized in what is considered its statutory genesis, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 One source of controversy is
whether the Supreme Court abrogated this “unambiguously colorblind” statute through its decisions to allow affirmative action
programs,30 or whether its legislative history allows consideration of race “in order to alleviate the historic problem of racial
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inequity.”31
Affirmative action law has undergone substantial change in
the forty years since its inception. Most affirmative action cases
are traceable to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
which allowed a public university to consider race as a factor in
its admissions process.32 The Court recently upheld the fundamental holding of Bakke, holding that it was legal to consider
race as one of many factors,33 yet illegal to automatically favor
an applicant based on race.34 Nonetheless, the Court will use
strict scrutiny to determine whether governmental race-based
affirmative action programs are narrowly tailored to the compelling government interest.35
The preceding discussion applies only to affirmative action
plans by governmental entities. The Supreme Court has noted
that affirmative action programs by private actors do not trigger
equal protection clause scrutiny.36 Thus, the affirmative action
principles delineated above will apply only to SPCPs that are
operated, either directly or indirectly, by the government. Truly
private SPCPs need not satisfy these rules. This section summarized the underlying law pertaining to the affirmative action-like
component of SPCPs which permit otherwise illegal discrimination. The next section introduces these anti-discrimination laws.

B. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN LENDING
While the Civil Rights Act (“CRA”) of 1968 generally prohibited discrimination by private actors in housing-related transactions,37 it neither “proscribed” lending discrimination, nor
established a comprehensive enforcement scheme.38 Thus, the
CRA was inadequate to protect creditworthy individuals against
credit discrimination on “often irrational” grounds.39
The ECOA was passed in 1974 to protect consumers on the
basis of sex and marital status in response to reports of credit
practices that ran contrary to the spirit of equality for all.40 For
instance, the ECOA was initially called a “Women’s Law” 41
because creditworthy females often had been unable to obtain
credit in their own names.42 Congress enhanced and expanded
the ECOA two years later in 1976.43 The ECOA prohibits a
lender from discriminating in “any aspect” of a credit transaction on the basis of sex, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, age, receipt of public assistance income, or exercising certain consumer rights in good faith.44 The ECOA protects a consumer in all stages of the credit process from the
lender’s conduct before it receives an application, the decision
whether to approve the application and on what terms, to the
treatment of the consumer once becoming a customer.45
1. OVERVIEW OF SPCPS
The SPCP was added to the ECOA in 1976. The three
types of SPCPs include: those authorized by law for the benefit
of an economically disadvantaged class;46 those offered by a
non-profit corporation for its members or an economically disadvantaged class;47 and those offered by a for-profit organization to meet special needs.48 To qualify, the targeted group need
not prove historical disadvantage or disparate treatment.49
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Credit unions, as not-for-profit institutions,50 fall into the
second category. Thus, while banks and for-profit lenders must
satisfy legal formalities before establishing an SPCP, a credit
union can create an SPCP without a formal plan for any group
or for any reason.51 Credit unions requested and received this
special treatment compared to other lenders because they feared
violating the ECOA by restricting lending to their members.52
Simply put, Congress wanted to permit “church-affiliated credit
unions” to only serve their members.53 Thus, Congress sought
to protect credit unions using the SPCP provision.
SPCPs are intended to help economically disadvantaged
individuals or meet special social needs. It is possible that the
SPCP provision was partially motivated by a federal commission report54 that recommended low-income individuals receive
credit on competitive terms, and presented case studies on programs that help the disadvantaged. Regardless, Congress had in
mind programs based on the applicant’s age when creating the
SPCP for for-profit organizations,55 as Congress did not intend
to prohibit positive credit programs aimed at “young adults.”56
SPCPs are clearly not limited to certain age groups, as the three
examples provided in Regulation B for SPCP programs targeted
to a specific audience are “race, national origin, or sex.”57
The SPCP allows creditors to engage in conduct that would
otherwise be discriminatory.58 A lender may require all participants in a SPCP to share a “common characteristic,” such as
age, while barring from the program those who do not meet this
characteristic.59 A creditor does not have free reign, though. As
a lender, the creditor is still subject to all other provisions of the
ECOA and cannot discriminate other than by requiring this common characteristic. SPCPs also cannot be structured to evade
the requirements of the ECOA. It is unlikely that a SPCP can be
used for any residential real estate-related loan program because
the Fair Housing Act does not include a SPCP exception.60
2. SPCPS IN PRACTICE
Just as Congress intended,61 a SPCP may overtly discriminate against specific protected classes or disparately treat62 certain groups. The Federal Reserve Board63 acknowledged this
when it found that a New York State law that prevented a SPCP
from being established on the basis of “race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or marital status” was preempted by the
ECOA.64 The Federal Reserve Board evidently realized that
Congress intended to allow SPCPs to discriminate. Furthermore, while not dispositive of the issue, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has stated in court filings that a
SPCP may be based on race, assuming the program meets all the
other legal requirements.65
The Federal Reserve Board proposed to clarify the regulation to indicate that a SPCP “should not have the effect of depriving people who are not part of the class of rights or opportunities they otherwise would have.”66 Regardless, federal bank
examiners are instructed to encourage banks offering SPCPs
based on a protected class to rename and restructure the program
based on factors “not prohibited by the ECOA,” such as “first41

time home buyer.”67
Indeed, the SPCP is used in a discriminatory manner. For
instance, the Virginia Housing Development Authority
(“VHDA”) precluded unmarried couples from participating in a
preferential loan program by requiring that the applicants be
related by “blood or marriage.”68 A federal court dismissed an
ECOA claim for marital status discrimination on which the
plaintiff would “plainly prevail”69 because the VHDA program
was a SPCP authorized by state law. Additionally, Mobil Oil
and the former OmniBank offered a SPCP that allowed female
or minority borrowers preferential treatment in the lending process when seeking a loan.70 Credit unions offer preferential
credit programs targeted to an age group under 62.71 While it is
unknown how many SPCP programs are in existence, the federal Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)72 issued a guidance
letter to the lenders it regulates in response to SPCP inquiries
from thrifts.73

THE SPECIAL PURPOSE EXCEPTION IS LIMITED IN
SCOPE
A. BASIC OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS
SPCP programs face limitations not inherent in the ECOA.
SPCPs may violate equal protection concepts or exceed the
scope of the ECOA law. Based on an equal protection analysis,
I offer here a multi-step test to gauge their legality.74
The first step is to determine whether the SPCP discriminates against a protected class. The eligibility requirements for
a SPCP may be based on either neutral factors or on the applicant’s membership in a protected class. An example of the former is a program that offers any first-time, low-income homebuyer with a credit on closing costs. An example of the latter is
a program that offers any person under 25 years of age with a
preferred rate on an installment loan. Both program structures
are now legal under the ECOA. However, it is clear that only
programs in the first category should be presumed legal. The
analysis for the first category of programs will end for purposes
of this article, although these programs would be illegal if they
violate the disparate treatment rules of the ECOA.75 By contrast, programs in the second category should be suspect owing
to their use of a prohibited class, and hence proceed to the next
step of the analysis.
The next step of analysis is to identify the type of discrimination.76 Discrimination can occur during either the underwriting process (when the lender decides whether to approve the
loan request), or after approval when the terms and conditions
(such as rates) are set. For instance, a program that enables
those under age 25 to receive a credit card regardless of their
credit history is an example of a lender discriminating during the
underwriting process, while a program offering a loan rate discount only to women would be an example of discrimination
through terms and conditions.
From there, the analysis splits depending on the type of
discrimination involved. Any program that offers terms and
conditions that are preferential compared to ordinary borrowers
42

is illegal, as SPCPs are not empowered to discriminate in this
matter.77 For any program that discriminates in the underwriting
process, the analysis hinges on whether the SPCP is operated by
a public or private entity. If the SPCP is purely private, the
lender discrimination is authorized because the program falls
under the SPCP exception to the normal anti-discrimination
rules of ECOA. Equal protection principles would not regulate
the private actor’s conduct. If the SPCP is public or governmental, the proper level of scrutiny to evaluate the SPCP is determined based on the protected class at issue. This article argues
that all SPCPs, even those offered by private lenders, must be
analyzed in this way.
The 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment generally provide
no protection against discrimination committed by private actors.78 Thus, an equal protection claim against a private entity
for a discriminatory program will fail if the lender is not (either
directly or indirectly) a state actor.79
However, the Constitution prohibits discrimination by a
private entity when there is a “sufficiently close nexus” between
the government and the lender’s questionable practice.80 The
government must provide sufficient encouragement, “either
overt or covert,” to make it responsible for the practice.81 In the
words of Judge Friendly, “the state must be involved not simply
with some activity...alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the injury...the state action,
not the private action, must be the subject of complaint.”82 For
example, governmental authorization does not exist when a statute governs deregulated, traditional business conduct,83 yet does
when the law creates a climate in which private parties may
choose to discriminate.84
SPCPs easily fit the second category as the SPCP creates an
exception that permits discrimination that would otherwise be
illegal; it is essentially a “statutory invitation to private actors to
discriminate.”85 In other words, lenders would be unable to
practice illegal discrimination but for the government’s SPCP
exception. This is clearly an invitation to discriminate; the government is the root cause of the private actor’s discrimination.
One commentator has noted that the Supreme Court will find
invitations to discrimination to be state action, as enticing discrimination is different from allowing the free market to independently develop.86 Consequently, all SPCPs must be analyzed
as state-administered programs.

B. WHY STATE ADMINISTERED SPCPS FAIL EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSIS
This section will analyze SPCPs that are expressly state
authorized or considered state actions.87 In reality, though, this
discussion applies to all SPCP programs since, as shown earlier,
all SPCP programs are government authorized. To recap, the
alleged state interest in allowing governmental entities and nonprofits to create SPCPs is to help an “economically disadvantaged class of persons,” for credit unions to serve their members,
and allow private entities to meet “special social needs.”88
A court performs the Equal Protection Clause analysis using
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the appropriate level of scrutiny. The court will use an intermediate scrutiny test for sex, strict scrutiny for race, color, religion,
and national origin, and rational basis scrutiny for marital status,
age, receipt of public assistance income, or exercising certain
consumer rights in good faith.
1. ANALYSIS UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY: RACE, COLOR, RELIGION & NATIONAL ORIGIN
Affirmative action programs based on race or national origin must use a strict scrutiny, or narrowly tailored, least discriminatory89 means to meet a compelling state interest.90 Any
SPCP based on classifications that are subject to strict scrutiny
(race, color, religion, and national origin) fails this test.
The Supreme Court has held that any person has “the right
to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny,” and that
“benign” discrimination cannot be held to a lower standard of
scrutiny.91 The Court later went a step further, and struck down
a university admissions program that automatically favored applicants on the basis of race.92 The Court applies strict scrutiny
to suspect programs based on color, religion, or national origin.
Regarding SPCPs, the Fifth Circuit found an analogous
federal program unconstitutional. In Moore v. USDA, the plaintiff was denied financing from a USDA program designed to
help “socially disadvantaged groups” due to his race, as the notification letter stated, in part, “No Whites.”93 Although his Fifth
Amendment equal protection claim failed for seeking monetary
damages and not equitable relief, the plaintiff succeeded in his
ECOA claim.94
A SPCP is not the least discriminatory means to accomplish
Congress’s stated goal or to serve its intended purpose. For instance, consider the situation of an immigrant from an impoverished Eastern European nation who owns a small business in an
impoverished community, yet would be precluded, simply because of skin color, from participating in a major bank’s SPCP
offering preferential underwriting standards.95 The stated goal
of helping the economically disadvantaged is clearly not served
when a business is unable to receive special financing terms
because of the owner’s race or national origin. Consequently,
any SPCP that is structured based on a particular class of individuals benefits solely that class and excludes similarly situated
individuals in other classes.
Likewise, it would clearly be more effective to offer credit
under a streamlined program to any individual without a credit
history, rather than only to those who share an arbitrary or immutable characteristic (such as age). In other words, a program
structured around neutral factors, such as economic need, would
be the most beneficial to society and most effectively fulfill
Congress’ stated goals.96 Perhaps this is why President Clinton
shifted the focus of affirmative action policy solely from membership in a protected class to residence in an economically distressed area as defined by poverty and unemployment data.97
Consequently, the least burdensome means test is not satisfied
by SPCPs.
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Additionally, Congress could have clarified that a credit
union may only lend to its members without creating a much
broader exception that favors credit unions over banks with respect to the ECOA.98 Therefore, these SPCPs are not narrowly
tailored (nor the least discriminatory means) to meet Congress’
goals of helping economically disadvantaged individuals, protecting credit unions, or meeting special social needs.99 Disadvantaged individuals and credit union members will receive the
same credit opportunities when a SPCP is structured on a neutral
basis.
2. ANALYSIS UNDER INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: GENDER
Gender discrimination is evaluated using intermediate scrutiny, although recent cases indicate that it is an elevated level of
intermediate scrutiny review.100 A program that discriminates
on the basis of gender violates the equal protection clause,
unless it serves an important governmental interest101 and has an
exceedingly persuasive justification.102 For instance, it was illegal to grant alimony in a divorce to the wife only, as the Court
held that it was not appropriate to use gender as a proxy for need
or assume the male was the primary breadwinner.103 Interestingly, gender-based affirmative action programs are less likely
to be invalidated than race-based programs.104
Nonetheless, the outcome of SPCPs using intermediate
scrutiny is the same as with strict scrutiny earlier. Specifically,
courts will review the stated purpose of any affirmative action
program to ensure its legality.105 As one court stated, “when
government undertakes affirmative action, it must present a
‘strong basis in evidence’ for doing so.”106
Here, Congress failed to adequately support its decision to
implement this affirmative action program to discriminate based
on a protected class. The House hearings do not discuss the
SPCP provision, except for testimony by an industry representative who sought an exemption from the ECOA for “negative
discrimination that results in the denial of credit” or “reverse
discrimination” programs.107 The House hearings included testimony on “affirmative approaches” by lenders, which were targeted to underserved, inner-city areas as much as they were designed to help “minority businessmen.”108 The Senate hearings,
interestingly, refer to the House hearings as being the justification for the SPCP exception.109 Therefore, SPCPs based on gender must fail because Congress failed to provide the requisite
strong justification.
3. ANALYSIS UNDER RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY: MARITAL
STATUS, AGE, RECEIPT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE INCOME, OR
GOOD FAITH EXERCISE OF CERTAIN CONSUMER RIGHTS
It is possible some SPCPs could be based on a protected
category within the ECOA, yet be subject only to rational basis
constitutional scrutiny.110 For example, a program could offer a
credit card to customers between ages 18 and 25 without regard
for the applicant’s length of credit experience. This program is
discriminatory against older borrowers who do not have credit
histories, as these older borrowers are, at a minimum, not encouraged to apply, and would be subject to the normal under43

writing criteria that would preclude them from obtaining credit.
It is likely that a SPCP based on any category reviewed
using rational basis scrutiny would satisfy an equal protection
analysis. Under rational basis scrutiny, a law is upheld assuming its means are, at least remotely, related to a health, safety, or
moral concern of government, even if there is a less discriminatory policy available.111 Additionally, courts will give particular
deference to the legislature on social and economic legislation.112 In short, courts give broad deference to the government
when conducting a review using the rational basis standard.113
Thus, a SPCP structured on any of these criteria would meet
constitutional scrutiny.

A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Since SPCPs are presumably illegal under equal protection
analysis in light of the information presented above, the ECOA
must be amended. This is because a SPCP should never be
based on a protected class, and credit unions should be held to
the same standards as banks under the ECOA. Two amendments are proposed below.
First, the ECOA should be amended to prevent membership
in a protected class from being a prerequisite for participation in
a SPCP. This may be accomplished by adding a provision to §
1691(c) that states, “A credit assistance or special purpose credit
program may not base its eligibility guidelines upon whether a
person is a member of a class of persons defined in § 1691(a).”
This amendment would preserve Congress’s intent to enhance
the credit opportunities available to the disadvantaged, yet
would protect a person from discrimination based on immutable
characteristics such as race or sex. The change would also ensure that SPCPs are subject to relaxed judicial scrutiny.114
For instance, a hypothetical SPCP designed to help those
without established credit histories should not be limited to only
those under age 25, as older individuals may not have credit
histories due to legitimate reasons such as being a recent immigrant to the United States or heritage from a culture that shuns
traditional financial service providers. A hypothetical program
based on class helps borrowers solely of a specific class who
have a credit problem, and not those in other classes with the
same credit problem. If the fair lending laws are relevant, a
lender should not be given the flexibility to discriminate when a
viable alternative is available to prevent discrimination.
Second, credit union issues require another amendment to
the ECOA. As described earlier, credit unions are broadly
granted more flexibility than banks to use SPCPs to discriminate. However, this is not the only way that credit unions receive favorable treatment under the ECOA. The National Credit
Union Administration (“NCUA”) enforces federal credit unions’
compliance with the ECOA.115 The NCUA must refer to the
DOJ all patterns or practices of ECOA violations that involve
either illegal discrimination in “any aspect”116 of a credit transaction or the improper discouragement or denial of applications.117 The DOJ provides Congress with an annual report
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summarizing the ECOA referrals it receives from the federal
regulatory agencies.118 These reports indicate that the NCUA
has made no referrals to DOJ, while the four bank regulatory
agencies have referred dozens of substantive ECOA violations
to DOJ. For instance, a General Accounting Office Report
showed that the NCUA made none of the 53 referrals between
1990 and 1995,119 and none of the 140 cases sent to DOJ between 1999-2004.120
On the one hand, the fact that the NCUA referred no ECOA
matters to DOJ could be an excellent sign because it suggests
that credit unions are in compliance with the fair lending laws.
Granted, credit unions are often smaller and less complex than
many banks, thereby indicating less fair lending risk.121 A former NCUA administrator even testified before Congress that
credit unions are “different” from other lenders because they “do
not deal with the general public” but rather those affiliated
through a common bond.122 Alternatively, it could indicate either that the NCUA is not making referrals to DOJ when required, or the Interagency Fair Lending Procedures are not being
properly implemented during examinations of federal credit unions.
Unfortunately, based on the author’s review of credit union
websites in April of 2005, it appears that the second scenario
may be true.123 Congress intended the mandatory referral provision of the ECOA to be an “enforcement mechanism” when
adding it to the ECOA in 1991.124 Credit unions already receive
preferred treatment compared to banks in other areas.125 Congress did not intend for the NCUA to put a low priority on the
ECOA.126 This is particularly important as credit unions are
becoming more analogous to banks by getting larger, more complex, and merging together.
Therefore, §1691 (c)(2) should be amended to clarify that
credit unions can lend to their members without violating the
ECOA, but may not otherwise receive less scrutiny than banks
when establishing a SPCP. The change can be accomplished by
revising §202.8(a)(2) to read, “It is not a violation of this section
for a nonprofit organization to extend credit only to its members.
A nonprofit organization may also create a special purpose program to meet special social needs pursuant to the standards prescribed in regulations by the Board.”
It is essential that the extra discretion given to credit unionrun SPCPs be eliminated and their rules mirror those for private
lenders. As mentioned earlier, Congress intended this provision
simply to protect credit unions from ECOA challenges. Amending this provision will allow Congress to clarify that credit unions may not use a credit assistance program to discriminate
without first meeting the same requirements as a bank. After all,
it does not matter to a consumer whether she is discriminated
against by a SPCP operated by a bank or a credit assistance program operated by a credit union. These proposed changes to the
ECOA will ensure that every creditworthy consumer has equal
access to credit regardless of immutable or arbitrary characterisTHE MODERN AMERICAN

tics such as race or national origin that fall under equal protec- sumer protection issue that affects solely one institution’s memtion analysis.
bers. Rather, fair lending enforcement is necessary to further
the national public policy goal of ensuring equal access to credit
CONCLUSION
by creditworthy borrowers. This article has shown that the
It is important that we do not forget that illegal discrimina- SPCP provision of the ECOA has not been updated to reflect the
tion still occurs in housing and finance despite the substantial changes in equal protection law over the past three decades. By
achievements achieved over recent years.127 Enforcing fair enacting the proposals propounded in this article, Congress can
lending laws is not just a safety-and-soundness issue or a con- ensure that all have equal access to credit.
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By Daniel Raposa*
S 535 “THE EMMETT TILL UNRESOLVED CIVIL RIGHTS
CRIME ACT”

S. 543 “DECEPTIVE PRACTICES AND VOTER
INTIMIDATION PREVENTION ACT OF 2007”

This bill would establish an Unsolved Crimes Section in the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. It would
also create an Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Investigative Office
in the Civil Rights Unit of the FBI.
Named in honor of the Emmett Till, whose murder in Mississippi in 1955 was one of the catalysts of the American Civil
Rights Movement, this bill would act as the benefactor for a
crucial area of civil rights crime work: unresolved civil rights
crime. It would partition and allocate resources to individual
divisions in the agencies that could be devoted solely to working
on cases whose resolutions remain in limbo.
Till himself was shot, beaten, and left in the Tallahatchie
River by two white men, who were acquitted at trial but later
confessed. The jury deliberations took only 67 minutes, and the
blasé attitudes of the all-white jury (one juror took a soda break
to stretch the deliberation time to over an hour) led to public
outrage in the United States and Europe, and helped kick the
Civil Rights Movement into high-gear.
Sen. Dodd (D-CT) introduced the bill for himself and Sen.
Leahy (D-VT). It is currently in the Judiciary Committee. A
companion bill, H.R. 923, was introduced by Rep. John Lewis
(D-GA). It currently has 66 cosponsors.

This bill makes a number of technical amendments to Subsection (b) of section 2004 of 42 U.S.C. 1971(b), in order to
crack down on reporting false election information and any deceptive practices in federal elections.
The legislation acknowledges that the right to vote is a fundamental Constitutional right and an underpinning of democracy. The bill’s findings recognize that huge strides have been
made in voter rights, particularly since the era of literacy tests,
poll taxes, and property requirements. The bill also recognizes
the Constitutional legacy of piecemeal inclusion of more and
more citizens with franchise. This includes the 15th, 19th, and
24th Amendments.
However, despite much forward progress, tactics that aim to
confuse certain demographics of voters and suppress voter turnout threaten today's elections. Principal among these new tactics
are the dissemination of false information, intimidation of voters
to dissuade them from voting, and attempts to influence those
who do vote.
There are countless examples of this voter intimidation and
influence. African-American voters in North Carolina received
false information about their voter registration status in 1990
and were threatened against trying to vote. In 2004, Native
American voters in South Dakota were turned away unnecessarily at polls for lack of photo identification. In the 2006 election,
some Virginia voters received messages telling them that they
were ineligible to vote and threatening criminal prosecution if
they tried. In 2006, in predominately African-American districts
of Prince George's County, Maryland, certain candidates distributed fliers insinuating that they belonged to the party of which
they were not members.
Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) introduced this bill, which
has notable co-sponsors, including Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY),
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and Sen. John Kerry (D-MA).

H.R. 998 “CIVIL RIGHTS HISTORY PROJECT ACT OF
2007”
This bill would create a project to collect oral histories of
individuals from the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) in the Library of Congress and the Smithsonian, and these oral accounts
would then be available to the public.
The purpose of the bill is to help American citizens learn
about the CRM through a vital primary source: oral histories.
The legislation emphasizes allowing future generations, who
would not necessarily have contact with persons involved in the
CRM, to be able to relive the history, struggles, and traditions of
the era. The project would have tremendous reach, as it would
help coordinate all preexisting efforts to archive oral histories at
the national level. It would also complement previous work that
has been done to archive other primary source materials on the
CRM. There is also an emphasis on assisting local efforts to
preserve similar oral histories.
Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY) introduced the bill, which
has 35 co-sponsors. It is currently in the House Committee on
House Administration.
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S. 556 “HEAD START FOR SCHOOL READINESS ACT”
This bill would make technical amendments to provisions
of Head Start (42 U.S.C. 9831), one of the most important social
programs for lower-income schoolchildren. The bill’s authors
recognize the vital role that Head Start plays in the social and
cognitive development of many of these children.
Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA) introduced this bill, and it is
currently in the Committee on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions.
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S. 358 “GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION
ACT OF 2007”
This bill would regulate and bar certain types of discrimination based on genetic information, including discrimination in
health insurance and employment discrimination.
Recognizing that advances in science and medicine with
respect to genetics hold the possibility of great societal advances, the authors of this bill also recognize the potential negative byproducts that the disclosure of genetic information brings.
The bill recognizes that although genes are facially neutral
markers, many genetic conditions and disorders are both more
prevalent and more readily associated with particular racial and
ethnic groups. This could lead to the stigmatizing of, and discrimination against, members of a particular group as a result of
that genetic information. An example of this phenomenon is the
occurrence of certain types of discrimination against African
Americans in the 1970s based on their higher tendency toward
sickle-cell anemia.
Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-ME) introduced the bill, which
currently has 25 co-sponsors and is in the Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions. Its companion bill is H.R. 493.

H.R. “NO MORE TULIAS: DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT
EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IMPROVEMENT
ACT OF 2007”
This bill seeks to “increase the evidentiary standard required to convict a person for a drug offense, to require screening of law enforcement officers or others acting under color of
law, participating in drug task forces, and for other purposes.”
The bill’s authors have come to the realization that some
programs funded by the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program have created and sustained racial disparities, corruption in law enforcement, and the commission of civil
rights abuses across the country. The Edward Byrne program
funds hundreds of regional anti-drug task forces. As these task
forces are administered by local officials with very little federal
oversight, racial and law enforcement issues have cropped up
and hampered the program’s effectiveness to combat drug problems while remaining race-neutral. The ACLU and other watchdog organizations have documented numerous occasions of local programs administered under the EBMJAG program presiding over false arrests and convictions.
The bill hopes to both streamline procedures for local programs receiving federal funds and ensure that states administer
proper oversight to these programs.

*Daniel Raposa is a second-year law student at American University Washington College of Law.
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Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) introduced the bill, and it
is currently in the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security.
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